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States regulate the substance of corporate governance. Fiduciary
duties, director qualifications, and the rights of shareholders all emanate
from state law.' Regulation of disclosure, on the other hand, falls to the

"Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Professor Brown is a founder of
the blog The Race to the Bottom, http://www.theracetothebottom.org. Thanks to those

who reviewed a draft of this article, including Theresa Gabeldon, Sandeep Gopalan, Celia
Taylor and Lisa Casey.
1. The stock exchanges play a role in the regulation of corporate governance as well.

The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for example, defines the term "independent,"
and requires a majority of independent directors on a board. See NYSE, Inc., Listed
Company Manual § 303A (2004). Independence under the NYSE definition is not the
same as under state law. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits:
"Independent" Directorsand the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 99-100
(2006). Moreover, the definition plays no role in the fiduciary obligations of directors. It
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission),' at least
for public companies.3 It is the Commission that ensures investors4 and
shareholders have the information necessary to make informed
decisions.
This neat dichotomy has been long accepted but little examined.6 In
fact, it is not a particularly accurate description. In the public company
arena, disclosure means little, absent adequate governance. No matter
how many accounting standards are implemented, enforcement
proceedings brought, or items added to Regulation S-K, the quality of
disclosure hinges on management's commitment to, and involvement in,
the process.
is merely a listing standard, with few penalties for violations. See infra notes 118-29 and
accompanying text.
2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). State law provides
inspection rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2006). In the realm of
public companies, those rights are largely supplanted by the periodic reporting system.
Two significant exceptions exist. Delaware courts have all but required the use of
inspection rights as a precondition to the challenge of the independence of the board of
directors. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1056-57 (Del. 2004) (affirming the dismissal by the Court of Chancery of a derivative
action where plaintiff shareholders failed to establish demand futility, which the Delaware
Supreme Court said could have been successfully established if plaintiff "used a Section
220 books and records inspection"). In addition, they are a useful mechanism for
obtaining a list of shareholders, something not guaranteed under the federal system. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2007) (giving companies the choice of either providing a list of
shareholders or sending materials to other shareholders on behalf of an insurgent
shareholder).
3. Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas- The Securities
and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
79, 80 (2005) ("The federal securities laws generally have been considered full disclosure
statutes, as opposed to merit regulation statutes or laws governing the internal affairs of
corporations."). Public companies are those that meet the requirements of section 12 (g)
of the Exchange Act, or are traded under a national stock exchange under section 12(b).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (giving
the Commission the authority to regulate the periodic reporting process).
5. See id. § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (giving the Commission the authority to
regulate the proxy process); see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) ("The
purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.").
6. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
775, 806 (2006) ("Federal securities law, not state corporate law, plays the most important
role in corporate governance in America today, primarily because 'disclosure has become
the most important method to regulate corporate managers and disclosure has been
predominantly a federal, rather than a state, methodology."' (quoting Robert B.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraudas CorporateGovernance: Reflections Upon
Federalism,56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003))).
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The division of authority did not arise from a comprehensive analysis
of the optimal method of promoting governance or a deliberate decision
to keep the Commission out of the substance of corporate governance,
but rather as a consequence of path dependence
When Congress
adopted the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, the central issue of
corporate governance was the absence of adequate disclosure.9
Management took advantage of secrecy to self perpetuate, pay excessive
salaries, and engage in other abusive practices. 0 With such secrecy, the
substantive corporate governance standards mattered far less.
Congress sought to fix the corporate governance process by addressing
the deficiencies this secrecy created. The disinfectant effect of disclosure
had a corresponding impact on the substantive standards, but not the one
expected. The pressure of self interest did not abate; it merely lost the
protection of secrecy. Instead, pressure built on states to loosen
substantive standards. Over time, the duty of care evolved into little
more than a wooden process, and the duty of loyalty into a standard
largely unmoored from fairness."
At the same time, the disclosure regime implemented by the
12
Commission itself impacted the substance of corporate governance.
7. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999)
("Corporate rules themselves ... are path dependent. Th[is] ...paper analyze[s] in turn
[the] two main sources of path dependence.").
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78nn (West 1997 & Supp. 2007)).
9. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (noting that the
"'fundamental purpose of the Act' [was] implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'
(quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970))).
10. See Phillip R. Stanton, Recent Development, SEC Reverses Cracker Barrel NoAction Letter, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 981 (1999) (discussing congressional intent behind
the enactment of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
11. The devolution of substantive standards in state law has been discussed at length
in a trilogy of articles. See generally Brown, supra note 1 ("Delaware courts have all but
eliminated meaningful limits on self-interested transactions."); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The
Irrelevanceof State CorporateLaw in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L.
REV. 317 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Irrelevance] ("Over time, state courts interpreted the
duties [to act with care, loyalty, and good faith] in a manner that left little substance. The
business judgment rule and universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions all but
eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of care. The duty of loyalty, particularly
self-dealing by officers and directors, could be validated through procedural mechanisms."
(footnote omitted)); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder
Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641 (2003)
("Despite the central importance of fairness to the duty of loyalty ... the trend has been
to eliminate any analysis of fairness, replacing substantive review with procedural
safeguards.").
12. See Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and CorporateGovernance,45 OHIO ST. L.J.
545, 563 (1984) (noting that "practically all of the important regulations affecting
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Under state law, shareholders had the inherent right to make proposals
or nominate directors from the floor of the meeting." The SEC proxy
rules, however, made the meeting itself a formality with votes cast as part
of the proxy process prior to the meeting. 4 Actions were destined to fail
unless shareholders competed for proxies. But the rules made this a time
consuming and prohibitively expensive process, effectively depriving
shareholders of their substantive rights.15
With the link between disclosure and substance increasingly clear, the
Commission embarked on an effort to regulate substance using a variety
of mechanisms, including disclosure. In the 1970s, Congress provided
increased authority to regulate the internal process of assembling
financial statements." Efforts were also made to influence governance
through the imposition of listing standards, an avenue largely foreclosed
by the courts.17 Enforcement proceedings 8 and regulatory admonitions"
were other avenues employed by the Commission.
None of these had the desired effect. By the 1990s, the Commission
began to use disclosure aggressively to alter the substantive behavior of
officers and directors. 2° 1 This was something different from the
Commission's past efforts. Much of the required information was, at

shareholder meetings and communications with shareholders have occurred under the
proxy rules rather than under state law").
13. Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1993) ("At common law, it was necessary for shareholders to
attend the annual meeting personally in order to exercise their voting rights.").
14. Id. at 1135; see also infra note 225.
15. Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate
Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 382 (1996) (describing the proxy solicitation process
as "expensive and time consuming").
16. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Stephen M. DeTore, Rationalizing the Disclosure
Process: The Summary Annual Report, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 39, 53-56 (1989)
(describing SEC rulemaking endeavors designed to increase disclosure of financial
statements).
17. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down an
SEC rule requiring one vote per share and noting that the requirement was "concededly a
part of corporate governance traditionally left to the states").
18. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 65 SEC Docket
1240, 1244 (Sept. 30, 1997).
19. See infra note 250 (discussing Commission efforts to improve quality of disclosure
in management discussion and analysis (MD&A)).
20. See Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, Investment
Company Act Release No. 10,510, 16 SEC Docket 348, 356 (Dec. 6, 1978) ("While the
Commission recognizes that the adoption of this disclosure requirement in some instances
may indirectly stimulate the establishment of audit, nominating and compensation
committees, the Commission believes that disclosure of the nonexistence of the named
committees serves a valid informational purpose.").
21. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securitiesand Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency,112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1270-71 (1999).
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best, marginally material to investors or shareholders. Disclosure was
instead designed to cause changes in corporate behavior by 2illuminating
practices that could result in embarrassment or legal liability. 1
The approach, however, was only marginally effective. Sometimes the
requirements resulted in a morass of boilerplate or unilluminating
discussion.' 3 In other instances, substantive behavior did not change even
with disclosure, in part because of the continuing downward evolution of
standards under state law.24 The result was often an additional wave of
even more complex disclosure.
More effective authority to influence governance came from the
Commission's growing authority to regulate management's involvement
in the disclosure process. 2' The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
required management to develop
and assess the internal controls used to
•26
formulate financial disclosure.
Congress largely left it up to the
Commission to determine the assessment process and, most importantly,
the role particular individuals would play in the process. In other words,
the Commission received the authority to impose standards of behavior
on officers and directors, at least in the context of financial disclosure.
The effects of this authority are only now being felt on the governance
process.
This Article will do several things. First, it will briefly examine the role
of the states and the Commission in the corporate governance process,
something more a product of history than a rational division of authority.
Second, it will identify some of the consequences of this division. Third,
the Article will look at the varied efforts by the Commission to break out
of the realm of disclosure and to regulate the substantive behavior of
officers and directors. Finally, the Article will examine the changes
wrought by SOX and the potential for a dramatic increase in the role of
the SEC in the corporate governance process.
I.

SUBSTANCE, DISCLOSURE, AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

Adopted during the Great Depression, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 delegated to the SEC" the authority to regulate the disclosure of
22. See id.
23. Brown, Irrelevance,supra note 11, at 354-55.
24. Id. at 355.
25. See id. at 359.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 789
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. V 2005)).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (West 1997 & Supp. 2007)). The Act also created the
Commission. Id. § 4. Until then, the task of overseeing the provisions of the Securities
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public companies.
Specifically, section 13(a) enabled the agency to
prescribe the "information and documents" required to be filed, 29
something that eventually evolved into a quarterly reporting system. The
provision filled an obvious gap in state law30 and the listing standards of
the stock exchanges."
The Exchange Act also addressed governance concerns with respect to
shareholders. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act gave the Commission
the authority to regulate proxies, another area of obvious regulatory

Act of 1933 fell to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). See
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET

JOEL SELIGMAN, THE

99 (3d ed. 2003). Ironically, Congress created the

SEC because of the perceived regulatory strength of the FTC. In other words, the SEC
was created to weaken enforcement. Id. at 97-99.
28. As originally enacted, the provisions applied to companies traded on a national
stock exchange. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b). Amendments in 1964,
however, extended the requirements to some companies traded in the over-the-counter
market. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a). The provision requires the disclosure of
"such information and documents.., as the Commission shall require." Id.
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6 (1934); see also 78 CONG. REC. 7705 (1934)
(noting that the need for additional disclosure arose from the "'growing tendency toward
extreme broadness and flexibility in the corporation laws of many States"'); see also 78
CONG. REC. 7699 (1934) (statement of Rep. Rayburn) (discussing disclosure requirements
in the Act and noting that "we know some of the States do not have any laws with
reference to this question and some have very poor laws with respect to it").
31. Interestingly, the use of listing standards as a vehicle for imposing periodic
reporting requirements was discussed. See STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION: LETTER
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY WITH AN ACCOMPANYING REPORT RELATIVE TO STOCK

EXCHANGE REGULATION 17 (Comm. Print 1934) ("Your committee believes that each
licensed stock exchange should be required to adopt listing requirements for the various
classes of issues listed on the exchange which will give to the public full, complete, and
pertinent information with respect to such securities, both at the time the securities are
admitted to trading and periodically thereafter."). Congress rejected the approach at least
in part because of concerns over the enforcement of listing standards. See S. REP. NO. 731455, at 70 (1934) ("Although the New York Stock Exchange has proclaimed the
searching nature of its listing requirements, evidence was adduced before the
subcommittee establishing that the exchange authorities were lax in their investigation of
listing applications."). For a description of the opposition of the NYSE to the Exchange
Act, see SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at 87-93.
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a). Historically, states imposed a few
ineffective restrictions on management's use of proxies. For example, a Massachusetts law
prevented salaried officers from being proxy holders. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
Statutory Developments in Business CorporationLaw, 1886-1936, 50 HARv. L. REV. 27, 33
(1936) (discussing an 1882 Massachusetts statute, MASS. PUB. STAT. (1882) c. 105-06).
Early statutes also limited the number of shares voted by any proxy holder. See, e.g., id.
Nonetheless, over time, state law ceased to impose any real limits on management's use of
the proxy process. Id. at 36 (noting that 1903 revisions of Massachusetts corporate code
"marked the end of any attempt ... to put obstacles in the way of control of the proxy
machinery by the management").
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failure." The provision was intended to remedy a number of abuses
chronicled during the hearing process, including the use of proxies "by
unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain control of the
" and to obtain approval
management by concealing and distorting facts ' M
for "vast bonuses out of all proportion to what legitimate management
would justify."35
The Commission, therefore, was expected to play a role in the
governance process. Disclosure was expected to be the main (but not
only) method36 of addressing these abuses of authority by directors. 37
With shareholders having the substantive authority to limit

33. As the Senate Report expansively stated:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies, on the one
hand, by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away
from honest and conscientious corporation officials; and, on the other hand, by
unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to retain control of the management by
concealing and distorting facts.
S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 77 (1934). Even the courts have recognized that the Commission's
authority in the proxy rules goes beyond disclosure. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC,
905 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("We do not mean to be taken as saying that disclosure
is necessarily the sole subject of § 14.").
34. S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 77; see also 78 CONG. REC. 7705 (1934) ("Managements
of properties owned by the investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate
themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies."); 78 CONG. REC. 7864 (1934) (statement
of Rep. Wolverton) (noting under the heading of "no improper regulation of business"
that the Act "seeks to make more difficult the use of official positions to self-perpetuate
the controlling management and thereby enables the individual stockholder in conjunction
with others to have a more reasonable opportunity to change the management when
occasion seems to justify").
35. See 78 CONG. REC. 7861 (1934) (statement of Rep. Rayburn). There were limits,
but those mostly applied to traditional matters of day-to-day management. See H.R. REP.
NO. 73-1838, at 35 (1934) ("The House bill does not contain a provision corresponding to
that contained in subsection (d) of section 13 of the Senate amendment providing that
'nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to interfere with the
management of the affairs of an issuer.' This provision is omitted from the substitute as
unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in this
respect."). For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the section 14(a), see
Williams, supra note 21, at 1235-46.
36. Even the D.C. Circuit, in Business Roundtable, acknowledged this. See Bus.
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411. There are plenty of examples of substance in the proxy rules.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(2) (2007) (limiting the duration of a proxy). State law
allows proxies of unlimited duration if agreed to in the appointment form. See, e.g.,
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 7.22 (2005).
37. Section 14(a) does not use the word disclosure. Instead, the Commission has the
authority to adopt rules that are "in the public interest" or are necessary "for the
protection of investors." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a). Moreover, the
Commission has long accepted that the provision extends beyond disclosure.
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management,3 adequate disclosure would be enough to enable them to

cast out misbehaving officials or veto excessive bonuses.3 9 Disclosure, in
other words, coupled with the authority of shareholders under state law,
was enough to solve the identified concerns.40 Other matters of
substance were left to the states.41
In the early years, the Commission largely stuck to the prescribed
role,42 promoting disclosure.
As a result, shareholders and investors
38. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 8094 (1934) (statement of Rep. McClintic) (noting that
abuse of the proxy process occurred because management "realize[d] that when they
obtain a sufficient number of proxies they have in their hands the power to vote
themselves as high a salary or bonus as they desire").
39. See Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) ("[Directors] have no right to
compensation for services rendered within the scope of their duties as directors, unless it is
authorized by the charter, by-laws, or the stockholders of the company.").
40. The legislative history does not indicate any significant awareness of the various
logistical problems that make collective actions by shareholders difficult. Nonetheless, the
problems were raised in a well-known article by William 0. Douglas, the third Chairman
of the Commission and Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally William 0.
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934). He called for
some type of quasi-public body that could act on behalf of shareholders. See id. at 1307.
For a discussion of weaknesses in disclosure's effect on investor behavior, see Susanna
Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006).
41. There was some discussion of the potential impact of the Commission's role on
the "management of the affairs of an issuer." See H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 35 (1934)
(deleting as unnecessary section 13(d) of the bill, which made explicit that the Commission
could not "interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer"); see also supra note
35. The concern seemed less about governance (that is the relationship between managers
and shareholders) and more about interference in day-to-day management.
42. See, e.g., McKesson & Robins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, [Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 72,020, at 62,110-12 (Dec. 5, 1940); see also Standing
Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, Securities Act Release No. 5237,
Exchange Act Release No. 9548, Investment Company Act Release No. 7091, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,670, at 81,424 (Mar. 23, 1972) ("To this
end, the Commission, in the light of the foregoing historical recital, endorses the
establishment by all publicly-held companies of audit committees composed of outside
directors and urges the business and financial communities and all shareholders of such
publicly-held companies to lend their full and continuing support to the effective
implementation of the above-cited recommendations in order to assist in affording the
greatest possible protection to investors who rely upon such financial statements."). Some
have criticized the Commission for its overdependence on disclosure, something described
as a lack of "regulatory creativity." See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2003). The Choi & Pritchard article
devoted only one sentence to the scope of regulatory authority and the lack of alternatives
to disclosure. See id. at 23 ("Alternatives to disclosure generally would require the SEC to
seek statutory authorization from Congress.").
43. The SEC occasionally acknowledged the lack of authority to regulate director
behavior. See Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 176 (1964) (explaining that securities laws
did not "define Federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of
business enterprises and nowhere empowers us to formulate administratively such
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received increasing amounts of information, some of which facilitated
shareholder enforcement of substantive rights. Within the first decade
after adoption of the Exchange Act, the Commission had put in place
disclosure obligations applicable to certain types of self-dealing
transactions" and executive compensation.
Although regulating output, these efforts did not address the process
used within public companies to formulate disclosure. Little or no effort
was made to ensure accountability or mandate a particular process.
Internal responsibility was left to the discretion of each company. Only
where the process culminated in inaccurate disclosure did the
regulatory standards," and that "[t]he diligence required of registrant's directors in
overseeing its affairs is to be evaluated in the light of the standards established by State
statutory and common law" (footnote omitted)); SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at 205
(indicating that the proxy provisions in the Exchange Act were considered "a minor first
step, to be succeeded by a more comprehensive federal corporate governance statute");
see also id. at 210 (noting an SEC study that recommended a system of federal
incorporation to end state "chartermongering").
44. See Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Investment
Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 SEC LEXIS 44, at *2 (Dec. 18, 1942) ("Information
must also be given showing all loans to officers and directors not made in the ordinary
course of business, together with a brief description of all material transactions of officers
and directors and their associates with the company or its subsidiaries."); Exchange Act
Release No. 1823, 1938 SEC LEXIS 678, at *19-20 (Aug. 11, 1938) ("If action is to be
taken with respect to the election of directors or other officials .... [d]escribe briefly any
substantial interest, direct or indirect, of such nominee or any of his associates in any
property acquired within 2 years or proposed to be acquired by the issuer or any of its
subsidiaries, other than property acquired in the ordinary course of business or on the
basis of bona fide competitive bidding. State the cost of the property to the issuer or
subsidiary and the cost to the vendor if the property was acquired by the vendor within 2
years prior to the acquisition by the issuer or subsidiary." (emphasis omitted)); see also
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 42, at 22 ("Managers considering a self-dealing transaction,
for example, may choose not to do so when related-party transactions must be
disclosed."). The current provision, Item 404, was put in place in 1982. See Securities Act
Release No. 6441, Exchange Act Release No. 19,290, Investment Company Act Release
No. 12,865 [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,281, at 85,533, 85,539
(Dec. 2, 1982). Thus, the disclosure of related party transactions allowed shareholders to
know about transactions that could violate a director's duty of loyalty. See generally Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (setting out the test for duty of loyalty).
45. Exchange Act Release No. 1823, supra note 44, at *21-24; see also Troy A.
Paredes, Information Overload and Its Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 417, 464 (2003) ("Two disclosure items of particular note when it comes to
reducing agency costs are Item 402 of Regulation S-K (dealing with executive
compensation) and Item 404 of Regulation S-K (dealing with conflict-of-interest
transactions). These disclosures have less to do with valuing the company and more to do
with deterring insider misconduct or mismanagement, although there is some overlap
between the goal of reducing agency costs and informed investor decision making. As
Professor Langevoort has stressed, the valuation of a company depends, at least in part, on
assessing the management team and the risk of corporate misconduct or
mismanagement.").
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Commission act, with corporate responsibility determined on a case-bycase basis. 46
At the same time, substantive standards of governance continued to
weaken. The duty of care evolved into a shill, reduced by an expansive
interpretation of the businessS•judgment
rule and the ubiquitous presence
47
of waiver of liability provisions. The duty of loyalty ceased to be about
fairness, with "independent" director approval eliminating any review of
the substance of the transaction. 48 Boards of directors had few
obligations to seek information and affirmatively monitor the activities of
the company. 49 The evolution favored the interests of management over
50
the rights of shareholders.
The decline in substantive standards and the resulting impact on the
disclosure process surfaced with a vengeance in the 1970s. Arising out of

the Watergate investigation, the SEC uncovered a pattern of foreign
bribes and illegal campaign contributions by public companies. 51 In
addition to the widespread nature of the problem, the payments
demonstrated weaknesses in the process of formulating disclosure,

46. Friedberg, Exchange Act Release No. 43,129, 72 SEC Docket 2553, 2556 (Aug. 8,
2000) ("He allowed his loyalty to a friend to override his obligations to ensure that the
company's disclosures were accurate and complete.").
47. See Brown, Irrelevance,supra note 11, at 318-19.
48. For a discussion on the gradual evisceration of the duty of loyalty, see generally
Brown, supra note 1.
49. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (discussing
that the board did not have an obligation to "put into effect a system of watchfulness
which would have brought such misconduct to their attention in ample time to have
brought it to an end"). The most recent iterations of the requirements in this area are not
much better. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) ("For the plaintiffs' derivative
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss, 'only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability."' (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
971 (Del. 1996))).
50. See Prentice, supra note 6, at 784-85 ("In addition to economic incentives, social,
behavioral, and psychological factors encourage directors to subordinate shareholder
interests. These include friendships with and loyalty to the CEO, collegiality and team
spirit that discourage asking the hard questions, deference to the CEO's authority, and the
directors' desire not to monitor others more strictly than they would like to be monitored
themselves." (footnotes omitted)).
51. As the Commission observed: "'Millions of dollars of funds have been
inaccurately recorded in corporate books and records to facilitate the making of
questionable payments. Such falsification of records has been known to corporate
employees and often to top management, but often has been concealed from outside
auditors and counsel and outside directors."' Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC
Docket 1143, 1145 (Feb. 15, 1979) (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 94TH CONG.,
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES

(Comm. Print 1976)). For an overview of the Commission's approach during this time
period, see SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at 539-51.
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particularly at the board level.52 The system of corporate record keeping
was not sufficiently robust to ensure that the payments were properly
reflected on the company's books and records.
When the SEC confronted the issue of corporate impropriety in the
1970s, the Chairman specifically disclaimed the need for federally
imposed "'behavioral standards.' 53 The problem was again viewed
through the lens of disclosure, this time at the board level. 4 With
adequate information, directors could take proper action.5
The
Exchange Act was amended to require, for the first time, the
maintenance of adequate books, records, and internal controls. 6 The
new requirements, however, did not address accountability.
The
provision said nothing about the people responsible for developing and
maintaining any system of internal controls. 7
With accountability still unaddressed in the statute, the Commission
58
cast around for alternatives. Attention focused on listing standards.
Pressured by the Commission, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
required listed companies to put in place audit committees consisting

52.

See SELIGMAN, supra note 27, at 536.

53.

Id. at 547.

54. Id. at 545-47.
55. As SEC Chairman Roderick Hills testified before Congress: "'[W]e need a more
effective reporting system so that directors will be aware of conduct that is clearly
incorrect by existing standards."' Id. at 547.
56. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat.
1494, 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). For a
discussion of the regulation of internal controls by the SEC, see generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Internal ControlsAfter Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's "Duty of
Care as Responsibilityfor Systems," 31 J. CORP. L. 949 (2006).
57. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237 (1997) (arguing that the board of directors should have
responsibility in the design and administration of internal controls). Violations of the
books and records provision were perceived as technical-merely an additional charge to
add whenever fraud was uncovered.
58. As one example, the SEC formed a commission to study the matter. See
Langevoort, supra note 56, at 953-54 ("In the face of continuing examples of financial
misreporting,... the SEC continued to express concern about financial misreporting and
made further changes to upgrade the quality of disclosure ....In the mid-1980s, a private
sector initiative led to the creation of the so-called Treadway Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, chaired by a newly departed SEC Commissioner, which made a
series of recommendations to address problems in the internal controls environment.").
59. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 1977 SEC
LEXIS 2252, at *4 n.9 (Mar. 9, 1977) ("The NYSE first suggested the concept of an audit
committee in 1940, and in recent years has strongly recommended that each listed
company form an audit committee preferably composed exclusively of outside
directors.").
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entirely of independent directors. 6° The initial foray did not accomplish
much. For one thing, the definition of independent did not actually
ensure independence.6 ' Additionally, the requirement did not define the
responsibilities of the audit committee, something left to state law.62
Similarly, enforcement of the new audit committee requirement was left
to the exchanges, not a particularly robust source."
Jawboning the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) worked only as
long as they all cooperated. As competition among the SROs grew,
however, resistance developed, with matters coming to a head over
efforts to ensure shareholder voting rights. 4 Confronting the need to
either delist General Motors or to abandon its longstanding policy of one
share one vote, the NYSE opted for the latter. 65 Delisting would
sent GM to NASDAQ, where no comparable rule existed. 66 have
The

60. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing
Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 340 (2001); see also Audit Committee Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release No. 41,987, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,648, at 55,649-50 (Oct. 14, 1999)
("Since the early 1940s, the Commission, along with the auditing and corporate
communities, has had a continuing interest in promoting effective and independent audit
committees. It was, in large measure, with the Commission's encouragement, for instance,
that the self-regulatory organizations first adopted audit committee requirements in the
1970s." (footnote omitted)); New York Stock Exchange, Inc., supra note 59, at *6 (noting
that "support for audit committees independent of management developed in the wake of
recent revelations of questionable and illegal corporate payments").
61. The definition of independent merely required that the directors be "independent
of management and free from any relationship that, in the option of its Board of
Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee
member." Filing of Amendment to Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No.
20,767, 30 SEC Docket 72, 73 n.5 (Mar. 20, 1984). NASDAQ merely required that a
majority of the directors on the audit committee be independent.
62. At the time, Delaware, for example, required little if any attention by the board
to the internal systems needed to provide information. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty
and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that
something is wrong.").
63. See Karmel, supra note 3, at 108 (describing a Blue Ribbon Committee created by
the NYSE and the NASD to "inquire into the adequacy of the audit oversight process by
independent directors"); infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
64. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 698 (2002) (discussing
disagreement among the exchanges over voting regulation).
65. Id. at 698-99. In 1926, the NYSE put in place the one share, one vote
requirement for shareholders, with minimum voting rights for preferred shareholders
instituted 14 years later. See Karmel, supra note 60, at 328-29. For a brief overview of the
listing standards in place prior to 1977, see New York Stock Exchange, Inc., supra note 59,
at *2 n.6.
66. See Rock, supranote 64, at 698-99.
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decision, therefore, was not about good corporate governance but rather
the result of competitive pressures. 61
The Commission tried, behind the scenes, to induce the NYSE and the6
NASD (the owner of NASDAQ) to adopt comparable voting rules.
Unsuccessful, the Commission simply required national exchanges and
NASDAQ to implement a one share, one vote standard, thereby
ensuring uniformity. 69 In what will no doubt be viewed as a Pyrrhic
victory, 70 the Business Roundtable challenged the rule and ultimately
prevailed, inducing the D.C. Circuit to conclude that the Commission
lacked authority to regulate the substance of corporate governance
through the mechanism of listing standards.71
With the use of mandatory listing standards to regulate governance
foreclosed, the Commission turned to enforcement proceedings to
increase accountability, particularly at the board level.72 In W.R. Grace, a
section 21(a) report,73 the company made inaccurate statements about
67. See id. at 699.
68. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988) ("[T]he SEC attempted to
broker an agreement on a uniform voting rights rule among the NYSE, the Amex, and the
NASD. However, these negotiations broke down, largely because of the Amex's
insistence on a one share, one vote standard.").
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) (2007) (prohibiting the exchanges from taking any action
"with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights
of holders of an outstanding class of classes of common stock").
70. The Commission relied on listing standards. Had this avenue been kept open, it
is possible that most corporate governance provisions would have been implemented in
this manner without the need for additional federal legislation. Listing standards, though
meaningful, are the least threatening source of regulation to public companies because
stock exchanges rarely take significant actions against violations, and no private right of
action exists.
71. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[S]tate
corporate law ... regulates the distribution of powers among the various players in the
process of corporate governance, and the Commission's present leap beyond disclosure is
just that sort of regulation.").
72. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co., supra note 18, at 1241 n.2. Prior cases had
emphasized the role of directors in the disclosure process but only when confronting
evidence of fraud. Id. (citing Cooper Companies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 35,082,
58 SEC Docket 591, 596 (Dec. 12, 1994); National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 14,380, 13 SEC Docket 1393, 1393 (Jan. 16, 1978); Gould, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 13,612, 12 SEC Docket 773, 774-75 (June 9, 1977); Stirling Homex Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 SEC Docket 298, 298 (July 2, 1975)). As the
Commission noted: "Each of these Reports focused on the failure of non-management
directors to act effectively when confronted with evidence of management's involvement
in possible securities fraud. The present matter, in contrast, deals with the obligations of
officers and directors where a company's violations do not constitute fraud." Id.
73. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1)
(Supp. V 2005). Section 21(a) allows the Commission "to publish information concerning
any ... violations, and to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it
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benefits paid to a retiring officer.
The Commission took the
opportunity to instruct the board on the need to maintain adequate
procedures to ensure accurate and complete disclosure.75 As the W.R.
Grace report emphasized:
Serving as an officer or director of a public company is a
privilege which carries with it substantial obligations. If an
officer or director knows or should know that his or her
company's statements concerning particular issues are
inadequate or incomplete, he or she has an obligation to correct
that failure. An officer or director may rely upon the
company's procedures for determining what disclosure is
required only if he or she has a reasonable basis for believing
that those procedures have resulted in full consideration of
those issues.
The report suggested that directors could be charged for failing to
implement adequate procedures, a task typically regulated under state
law fiduciary duties.77
Although calling on officers and directors to play a more active role in
the disclosure process, the legal premise for the approach was unclear.
The disclosure process mostly involved areas traditionally regulated
under fiduciary obligations rather than the federal securities laws and
was, therefore, outside the bailiwick of the Commission. Perhaps as a
may deem necessary or proper" in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Exchange Act.
Id.
74. W.R. Grace & Co. Order Instituting Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No.
39,156, 65 SEC Docket 1236, 1236 (Sept. 30, 1997).
75. W.R. Grace & Co., supra note 18, at 1244 n.16 ("Procedures or mechanisms
established to identify and address disclosure issues are effective only if individuals in
positions to affect the disclosure process are vigilant in exercising their responsibilities.");
see also Cooper Companies, Inc., supra note 72, at 596 ("The Commission considers it
essential for board members to move aggressively to fulfill their responsibilities to oversee
the conduct and performance of management and to ensure that the company's public
statements are candid and complete.").
76. W.R. Grace & Co., supra note 18, at 1244; see also Cooper Companies, Inc., supra
note 72, at 596 ("By failing to take immediate and decisive corrective action on these
matters, the Cooper Board appeared to prefer management's interest in keeping the facts
secret over the investors' interest in full, fair and accurate disclosure under the federal
securities laws.").
77. See W.R. Grace & Co., supranote 18, at 1244.
78. One commissioner dissented from the W.R. Grace report, noting that the
company had policies and procedures in place that were designed to ensure accurate
disclosure. Id. at 1245. Moreover, he observed that "there do not appear to have been
any 'red flags' or warnings to indicate that this system -which included the employment of
respected and competent securities counsel-was breaking down, or was inadequate to
produce documents that would comply with the federal securities laws." Id.; see also
Cooper Companies, Inc., supra note 72, at 596 ("The Commission has long viewed the
issue of corporate governance and the fiduciary obligations of members of management
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result, there was little follow-up, 79 with the decision having at best
marginal impact on board behavior.80
The Commission also used enforcement proceedings to reform
corporate governance within particular companies, sometimes requiring
8 or to particular committees
officers to report directlyS to
82 the board
(often the audit committee), and sometimes mandating training for the
board. 83 In a handful of instances, the Commission has required a
complete change in the corporate governance structure of a company,84
and the boards of directors of public companies to their investors as an issue of paramount
importance to the integrity and soundness of our capital markets.").
79. The importance of independent directors received some attention. See Walt
Disney Co., Exchange Act Release No. 50,882, 84 SEC Docket 1832, 1834 (Dec. 20, 2004).
80. A search of the LexisNexis database reveals only five citations to the W.R. Grace
report, all for relatively modest propositions. The Commission has, however, continued to
stress the importance of the board in the disclosure process. See Standards Relating to
Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8820, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,001, 79 SEC Docket 2876,
2878 (Apr. 9, 2003) ("Effective oversight of the financial reporting process is fundamental
to preserving the integrity of our markets. The board of directors, elected by and
accountable to shareholders, is the focal point of the corporate governance system. The
audit committee, composed of members of the board of directors, plays a critical role in
providing oversight over and serving as a check and balance on a company's financial
reporting system.").
81. See, e.g., Warnaco Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,675, 82 SEC Docket
2934, 2943 (May 11, 2004) (requiring that "Warnaco's general counsel continue to report
directly to the audit committee of the board of directors on any matter relating to
Warnaco's financial reporting obligations").
82. See, e.g., SEC v. Hurley, Litigation Release No. 19,986, 2007 SEC LEXIS 216, at
*6 (D. N.H. Feb. 1, 2007) ("Enterasys was further ordered to comply with its undertaking
to appoint an internal auditor who reports directly to the audit committee of the
company's board of directors."); see also Hycel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,981, 15
SEC Docket 315, 317-18 (July 20, 1978) (requiring audit committee to review certain
policies annually with respect to executive compensation).
83. See, e.g., Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651, Exchange Act Release
No. 53,049, 87 SEC Docket 103,105 (Jan. 4, 2006) ("The Financial Policies Consultant
shall also consider, based on his/her review, the nature and extent of Applix Board of
Directors training required to minimize the possibility of future violations of the federal
securities laws by Applix, acting through its finance and accounting employees.").
84. See, e.g., SEC v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,485,
86 SEC Docket 2224, 2225 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2005) ("The remedial undertakings include
appointment of new Chief Executive and Financial Officers, creation of an independent
audit committee and majority independent board of directors, and retention of an
independent consultant to analyze the company's internal accounting controls,
recommend improvements and oversee implementation of those improvements. These
undertakings represent an unusual departure from the Commission's policy of limited
intrusion into corporate governance, but were required by the unique facts of this case: the
company's current two person board of directors consists of its Chairman, President and
CEO Kushner who will now be barred from serving as an officer or director of any public
company, and its Principal Financial and Accounting Officer James DiLorenzo who is a
defendant litigating similar charges of fraud brought by the Commission.").
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including at least one instance of mandatory term limits for board
members.85
These enforcement proceedings, however, have not broadly affected
the governance process. The Commission's undertakings to alter the
governance structure of particular companies have not provided broad
lessons encouraging duplication.
Instead, they have largely been
solutions designed to remedy specific problems and have been rather
idiosyncratic in application.
II. SUBSTANCE AND DISCLOSURE: THE EARLY YEARS

With continued concerns about both the governance process and
accountability, the Commission found itself back at the beginning, largely
limited to disclosure to affect practices. Increasingly, therefore, the
Commission ••began to use disclosure
to directly influence substantive
86
behavior of directors and officers.
Early efforts focused on compliance with specific provisions of the
securities laws. 7 Other efforts sought to provide directors inside the
boardroom with leverage to address misbehavior.8 Gradually, however,
the requirements extended to a wider array of practices and a wider
array of behavior involving traditional areas of corporate governance. 89

85. See SEC v. Parmalat Finanziaria, Litigation Release No. 18,803, 83 SEC Docket
1416, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2004) ("Parmalat Finanziaria has agreed to adopt changes to
its corporate governance to promote future compliance with the federal securities laws,
including adopting by-laws providing for governance by a shareholder-elected board of
directors, the majority of whom will be independent and serve finite terms; specifically
delineating in the by-laws the duties of the board of directors; adopting a Code of Conduct
governing the duties and activities of the board of directors; adopting an Insider Dealing
Code of Conduct; and adopting a Code of Ethics. The by-laws will also require that the
positions of chairman of the board of directors and managing director be held by two
separate individuals." (emphasis added)).
86. Williams, supra note 21, at 1211 & n.62.
87. See discussion infra Part II.A.
88. See discussion infra Part II.B.
89. See Williams, supra note 21, at 1270-71 (discussing the disclosure requirement and
noting that "the SEC explicitly recognized its power to adopt disclosure regulations
concerning quintessentially corporate governance issues with the purpose of influencing
corporate conduct, as well as to provide information to shareholders"); see also Paredes,
supra note 45, at 463 ("A.A. Sommer drew the following analogy: 'Very simply put, if
every instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less adultery.'
And Louis Loss put it this way: 'People who are forced to undress in public will
presumably pay some attention to their figures.' William 0. Douglas contributed the
following: '[T]he terroristic phases of the [Securities] Act are dominant. Real protection is
afforded investors by scaring other people."'(footnotes omitted) (alterations in original)).
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A. Disclosureand Compliance
Early efforts to regulate substantive behavior of officers and directors
focused on improving compliance with the securities laws. This occurred
most noticeably in connection with the beneficial ownership reporting
requirements. 0 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibited
short swing profits and gave shareholders a private right of action for
violations.91 The provision depended upon disclosure by corporate
insiders and large shareholders of changes in their equity holdings. 9,
These reporting obligations, however, were routinely ignored, 3 and the
Commission had few weapons to combat the delinquencies.94

90. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (Supp.
V 2005).
91. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b); see also Owners Reports and
Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal Security Holders, Securities Act Release No.
8600, Exchange Act Release No. 52,202, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,025, 85
SEC Docket 3368, 3369 (Aug. 3, 2005) ("Unlike insider trading prohibitions under general
antifraud provisions, Section 16(b) operates without consideration of whether an insider
actually was aware of material non-public information. Section 16(b) operates strictly,
providing a private right of action to recover short-swing profits by insiders, on the theory
that short-swing transactions (a purchase and sale within six months) present a sufficient
likelihood of involving abuse of inside information that a strict liability prophylactic
approach is appropriate." (footnotes omitted)).
92. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b) (describing the required disclosures);
see also Owners Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 27,148, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,112,
44 SEC Docket 526, 545 (Aug. 18, 1989) ("The Commission is particularly disappointed to
find that notwithstanding the publicity and concerns expressed about the substantial
delinquency in filings, there has not been a substantial improvement in compliance. In a
recent study, the Commission found 36.7 percent of the transactions reported in calendar
year 1988 were reported more than three days late. As of June 10, 1989, the delinquency
rate was 34.7 percent for transactions reported in the first five months of 1989. This
reinforces the Commission's conclusion that the proposed proxy disclosure and fines are
necessary.").
93. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal
Stockholders, Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, Investment Company Act Release No.
16,669, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997, at 50,017 & n.208 (Dec. 13, 1988) (noting a delinquency rate of
more than fifty percent in filings).
94. The Commission tried to bring enforcement actions to encourage compliance.
See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of Am., Litigation Release No. 10,469, 30 SEC Docket 1558, 1558
(D. D.C. July 23, 1984). The approach expended resources with little apparent success.
Part of the problem was the remedy. At the time, the agency lacked the authority to
penalize those violating the requirements. That authority only came in 1990. See
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101429, §§ 101, 202, 104 Stat. 931, 932, 937 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2000 &
Supp. V 2005), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007)) (providing agency with
authority to seek civil monetary penalties in court proceedings and to impose monetary
penalties and order disgorgement in administrative proceedings).
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Frustrated, the Commission proposed disclosure obligations that
effectively required the company to police compliance.95
Proxy
statements had to reveal violations of the reporting obligations." The
disclosure would potentially embarrass the company and alert the
Commission to violations. The Commission all but admitted that the
requirements were designed to increase compliance rather than to
provide investors and shareholders with material information.9
The Commission's effort worked. Behavior changed. Compliance
improved. But it was not a model easily duplicated. The rules did not
actually affect the actions of the executive officers or directors as much
as it imposed responsibility on the company for ensuring compliance.
B. Disclosure and Leverage
Other disclosure requirements sought to improve the governance
process by increasing the leverage of dissenting directors. Companies
were made to disclose any disagreement that resulted in a director

resigning or deciding not to stand for re-election. This information was
ostensibly designed to assist shareholders in assessing the "quality of
management." 99 More to the point, the information "could enhance the
effectiveness of directors by assuring them a forum in which to express
differences of opinion on matters that are sufficiently serious to result in
termination of the director's association with the issuer."' °0
In other words, the provision gave the dissenting director leverage."'
Any resignation over a disagreement would result in public disclosure of
the underlying conflict, potentially generating bad publicity and inviting

95. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors, and Principal
Stockholders, supra note 93, at 545-46 (describing the Commission's concerns about
"widespread lack of compliance with the reporting requirements" and its subsequent
revision of the disclosure requirements in response).
96. See id. at 528.
97. See id. at 545.
98. Shareholder Communications, supra note 20, at 363.
99. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,970, 15 SEC Docket 291, 299 (July 18, 1978).
100. Id. The provision did not apply to a resignation or failure to stand for re-election
for "personal reasons." Id.
101. Commentators complained about the impact on governance, contending that it
would discourage the development of stronger boards and hamper debate. See
Shareholder Communications, supra note 20, at 358 ("Some commentators who opposed
adoption of the proposal were concerned that this disclosure would discourage the
evolution of stronger boards by increasing divisiveness among board members. Others
noted that the proposal might make it more difficult to attract and retain directors with
divergent viewpoints.").
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legal scrutiny 1 2 This threat, therefore, provided the dissenting director
additional bargaining power in connection with any disagreement at the
board level.
The structure of the provision made clear that it was designed to
provide leverage rather than material information to investors. As
originally adopted, the rules gave the resigning director sole discretion to
determine whether disclosure of the disagreement should occur. 3 Thus,
disclosure depended not upon its importance to investors or shareholders
but upon the predilections of the departing director. Only in 2004 did
the Commission finally eliminate this discretion and impose an
affirmative duty to disclose a disagreement, irrespective of the wishes of
the resigning director. 1°4

The impact of the provision is hard to assess since it sought to use the
threat of disclosure to encourage resolution of differences at the board
level. The potential impact on governance, however, has always been
limited. The provision applies only to conflicts at the board level.
It
does nothing to ensure that the board has any particular information
about the activities of the company, or that conflicts or problems are
addressed at the board level in the first instance.
C. Disclosureand Attendance

Other efforts focused more generally on altering board behavior.
Board involvement in the disclosure process meant little if directors did
102. The consequences of the new provision came home loud and clear when a
director of Hewlett Packard resigned, forcing the company to file a current report and
ultimately resulting in the disclosure of an investigation of board members and certain
questionable practices such as pretexting. See Damon Darlin & Matt Richtel, Spying
Uproar Causes Shuffle in Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at Al; Hewlett-Packard
Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/47217/000110465906059471/a06-19246_18k.htm.
103. Only where the resigning director provided the board with a letter explaining the
disagreement was disclosure mandated. Shareholder Communications, supra note 20, at
359 ("[Tlhe Commission believes that, on balance, it is more appropriate to require
disclosure only upon the request of the director. If disclosure is triggered by director
request, the director will have a forum if he chooses to use it, and the issuer will be
relieved of any obligation to document and characterize what it believes are the reasons
for director resignations."). Originally, the Commission required the disclosure to be filed
within fifteen calendar days, but it eventually reduced the filing period to five business
days. See Acceleration of the Timing for Filing Forms 8-K, Securities Act Release No.
6822, Exchange Act Release No. 26,587, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,844, 42
SEC Docket 1348, 1348 (Mar. 2, 1989).
104. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 8400,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 82 SEC Docket 1480, 1497 (Mar. 16, 2004). The
director still had the right to file a letter with the company and the letter had to be filed as
an exhibit. Id.
105. See id.
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not participate in the governance process by attending the meetings.
State law, however, imposed no specific obligations on director
attendance. In response, the Commission adopted rules requiring
disclosure of any director who attended fewer than seventy-five percent
of the combined total of board and committee meetings.' °6 The
Commission noted that this information would assist shareholders in
evaluating the director's performance. 7
In fact, the disclosure requirement was designed to affect director
behavior. Directors would presumably attend meetings more often
rather than confront the embarrassment associated with poor
attendance.'08 This requirement may or may not have increased
attendance, but in any case it did little to affect the actual process of
deliberations within the boardroom, a matter determined under state
law.1°9 Nor did the requirement ensure that directors take greater
106. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(b) (2007); see also Shareholder Communications, supra note
20, at 358 ("The Commission recognizes that in particular instances directors may provide
the board with valuable insight and expertise without actually attending formal meetings
on more than an intermittent basis. However, we believe that these occasions are likely to
be the exception and that, in general, attendance is an indication of effective board and
committee functioning and is relevant to an evaluation of directors for election purposes.
In addition, the Commission is not persuaded that the contemplated disclosure would
deter responsible boards from holding meetings when it is appropriate to do so.").
107. Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, supra note 99, at 299
("While the Commission believes that, as a general matter, disclosure of attendance
records would be of limited usefulness, it has tentatively concluded that disclosure of a
director's failure to achieve a certain minimum level of attendance could provide
information which would facilitate shareholder assessment of his performance as well as
the effectiveness of an issuer's board and committee system generally.
In the
Commission's view, the approach reflected in proposed Item 6(e) would elicit such
information in the briefest and least burdensome manner."). In rare cases, the disclosure
of attendance might lead to the reelection defeat of a director. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN,
NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR

ELECTIONS 1 (2007), http://ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudylll207.pdf ("[I]n 2007,
only one director received a majority against vote at a company with majority voting. Mae
Jemison, an incumbent director at Gen-Probe, Inc., received a majority against vote based
upon her failure to attend at least 75% of board meetings held in 2006. After consulting
with ISS, the board declined to accept her resignation, with the understanding that the
attendance issue would be addressed.").
108. See Williams, supra note 21, at 1265 ("This newly required disclosure was wholly
unrelated to any theory of economic materiality. Rather, its stated purpose was to
increase the corporation's accountability to society by encouraging the board to be more
active and independent in monitoring management's actions with respect to compliance
with the law."). This may be even truer today. A growing number of companies have
adopted by-laws that require director candidates to receive a majority of the votes cast to
be elected. Poor attendance might make this majority harder to obtain.
109. Cf.Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare The Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393, 452 n.317 (2005) ("In
2000, all Enron directors attended at least 75% of the total number of meetings, which
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ownership of corporate disclosure issues or engage in more protracted
deliberations on matters of concern to shareholders.
III. THE DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE: THE SEC, THE SROs, AND SOX
Early efforts at using disclosure to affect governance were modest in
scope and effect. In the aftermath of Business Roundtable, this changed.
Disclosure became a mechanism designed to directly affect the
deliberative process within the board room. It did so in three broad
ways.
First, the Commission sought to use disclosure to ensure greater
independence of those on the board." ° Second, the Commission sought
to increase the transparency of the decision making process."' Third, the
SEC designed disclosure requirements to limit the influence of the CEO
in the governance process.12
The rules often operated by requiring disclosure of a company's
compliance with listing standards."3 This approach created an additional
enforcement mechanism, at least in cases where compliance was
4
misstated."
The rules also expanded upon the obligations imposed by
5
SOx."
A. Disclosureand Listing Standards
Despite the loss in Business Roundtable, the Commission did not
entirely give up on listing standards as a mechanism for influencing
included nine board meetings and an additional eight to seventeen other meetings
depending on the individual subcommittee.").
110. See infra notes 130, 172-79 and accompanying text. As the Commission noted:
"The independence of directors is a linchpin of sound corporate governance, and
is crucial to the objective oversight of management .... The Commission's
disclosure program endeavors to illuminate the information that would allow a
shareholder to evaluate the independence of the directors and vote on a more
fully informed basis with respect to the election of directors."
Walt Disney Co., supra note 79, at 1834.
111. See Cynthia Glassman, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
ECGI/ALI 2006 Transatlantic Corporate Governance Conference: Corporate Governance
in the United States (June 27, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch062706cag.htm (describing the SEC's role in corporate governance and stating
"[slunlight is indeed the best disinfectant, and disclosure requirements may often
discourage self-dealing and encourage better governance").
112. See discussion infra Part Ill.B; see also id. ("What benefits management may not
always be in the best interests of shareholders, large or small.").
113. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at
2879.
114. Id. at 2879-80.
115. Id. at 2911-12 (outlining the measures undertaken by the Commission pursuant to
the requirements of SOX).
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corporate governance. " ' In the aftermath of Enron and Worldcom, the
exchanges and NASDAQ" 7 were once again pushed to adopt more

stringent standards. 18 Wanting to head off increased federal regulation,
the SROs had an incentive to cooperate, and an NYSE committee
recommended amendments to the listing standards that went beyond the
requirements of SOX." 9
The SROs ultimately implemented a number of additional governance
requirements. Boards of listed companies had to have a majority of
independent directors and to create three specific committeesnominating, compensation, and audit-with each containing only
independent directors. 12
The definition of independence was
strengthened, particularly 2through the addition of a number of

categorical disqualifications. 1
Although an improvement on the existing state of affairs, the new
listing standards suffered from a number of limitations. For one thing,
the standards were not sufficiently rigorous.
The definition of
independent
did
not
adequately
capture
all
potentially
disqualifying
•
- t.
122
relationships.
The listing standards did not address non-family
116. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 (2002), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf (noting that the NYSE appointed the
committee authoring the report appointed after the SEC Chairman "asked the NYSE to
review its corporate governance listing standards.").
117. Having been spun off from the NASD, NASDAQ was approved by the
Commission as a national stock exchange. See Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market,
Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 87 SEC Docket 348, 370 (Jan. 13, 2006).
118. See Karmel, supra note 3, at 109 ("Following the collapse of Enron in February
2002, the SEC asked the SROs to further review their listing requirements with the goal of
enhancing the accountability, integrity and transparency of listed companies."); see also
New York Stock Exchange: Plus qa Change,THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2003, at 67.
119. The proposed reforms emerged from a study completed in the summer of 2002,
just before the enactment of SOX. See generally REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE,
supra note 116; see also Karmel, supra note 3, at 109. In fact, the exchanges and
NASDAQ emerged almost unscathed from the enactment of SOX.
120. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.01, .04-.07 (2004); Amex
Company Guide § 121(A), (B)(2)(c) (requiring that a majority of directors be
independent with certain exceptions for small business issuers). The definition of
independent is different for members of the audit committee, a consequence of SOX. See
infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
121. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2004); see also SelfRegulatory Organizations Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 47,672, 79
SEC Docket 3074, 3076-77 (Apr. 11, 2003).
122. The Amex independence standards, for example, provide that "an independent
director of a listed company may not be an officer or employee of the company or any
parent or subsidiary thereof, or have a material relationship with the listed company that
would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment."
Self-Regulatory
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relationships, nor did they address outside business relationships with
executive officers.1 2
The standards also generally excluded the
consideration of fees in determining material financial relationships with
the listed company, irrespective of the amount. 24
Most important, however, was the problem of enforcement.
Shareholders lacked a private right of action for violations. Nor did the
Commission enforce the requirements."' That left only the SROs, and
they had a history of weak enforcement."' The exchanges possessed only
a limited array of potential sanctions largely
limited to delisting,
12 7
suspension from trading, or a letter of censure.
Organizations Notice of Filing, Exchange Act Release No. 54,851, 89 SEC Docket 1175,
1179-80 (Nov. 30, 2006). All of the exchanges had the same or similar definitions. Id. at
1179 ("[The Amex] independence standards are substantially the same as NASDAQ
standards and are conceptually similar to NYSE standards." (footnote omitted)).
123. The rule says nothing about non-family personal relationships. Moreover, the
rule does not specifically address outside business relationships between the CEO and a
director. Take, for example, the issues surrounding the backdating scandal that engulfed
the CEO of UnitedHealth Group. An internal investigation uncovered that one of the
"independent" directors had undisclosed ties to the CEO. See James Bandler & Charles
Forelle, How a Giant Insurer Decided to Oust Hugely Successful CEO, WALL ST. J., Dec.
7, 2006, at Al.
124. See Amex Company Guide § 121(A)(2)(b) (2003) (disqualifying anyone making
in excess of $100,000 during any twelve month period within the prior three years, but
excluding "compensation for board or board committee service"). The deliberate nature
of this approach can be seen from the exchanges' reaction to SOX. Congress included a
far stricter definition of independent in SOX, but applied it only to members of audit
committees. The exchanges could have made the definition universal, but did not. Amex
Company Guide § 121(B)(2)(a)(i) (2003) (requiring directors on an audit committee to
satisfy "the independence standards specified in Section 121A and Rule 1OA-3 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934"). Thus, two different standards apply under the listing
requirements: one for audit committees and another for the rest of the board.
125. The Commission can only sanction the exchanges and NASDAQ for not
enforcing their own listing standards. See Covered Securities, Securities Act Release No.
7494, Exchange Act Release No. 39,542, 66 SEC Docket 583, 587 (Jan. 2, 1998) ("Finally,
the Commission notes that enforcement of an SRO's listing standards is subject to
periodic inspections by Commission staff, as is enforcement of all SRO rules, and should
the Commission find that an exchange designated in Rule 146(b) is not adequately
enforcing its requirements for initial and continued listing, the Commission will take
appropriate action to revoke that exchange's exemption."); see also American Stock
Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 55,507, 2007 SEC LEXIS 535, at *1-2 (Mar. 22,
2007) (Commission brought cease and desist action against Amex for, among other things,
failing to adequately enforce its own rules).
126. See supra notes 31 and 125; see also infra note 128.
127. Any notice from the exchange about non-compliance must be disclosed. See Item
3.01, Current Report (Form 8-K). The disclosure requirement does not apply, however, to
an "early warning" notice of an impending violation. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure
Requirements, supra note 104 ("An early warning notice that merely informs the company
that it is in danger of falling out of compliance with a rule or standard for continued listing
on the exchange or association is not a notice that the company no longer satisfies that
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Rigorous enforcement, however, was also bad for business. Delisting
would result in a loss of fees paid by the company and would therefore
reduce the trading volume of the exchange.
The consequences were
even more severe in an
era
when
the
exchanges
had largely shifted to
129
"for profit" businesses.

The Commission used disclosure to alter this basic framework. Public

companies were essentially required to reveal compliance with the rules
of the exchange. They had to identify the directors who met the
definition of independent 3 ° and the existence and membership of
auditing,"' nominating,"' and compensation committees. 33

rule or standard. Thus, a company's receipt of such a notice will not trigger a disclosure
obligation under the item. However, if the warning notice informs the company that it is
out of compliance with a rule or standard for continued listing, but that the company will
not be delisted if it cures the problem within a specified time, such a notice will trigger a
Form 8-K filing requirement.").
128. As a result of the business consequences, the NYSE has a weak record in delisting
companies for noncompliance. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release
No. 41,634, 70 SEC Docket 342, 344 (July 21, 1999) ("Over the past sixty years, only one
issuer has delisted its securities from the NYSE." (footnote omitted)). Indeed, a bias
against delisting larger companies is built into the rules of the NYSE. See NYSE, Inc.,
Listed Company Manual § 802.01E (2007) (providing that the exchange has discretion to
continue listing where company "may have a position in the market (relating to both the
nature of its business and its very large publicly-held market capitalization) such that its
delisting from the Exchange would be significantly contrary to the national interest and
the interests of public investors"); see also Navistar Int'l Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
55,304, 2007 SEC LEXIS 319, at *2.4 (Feb. 13, 2007) (discussing Rule 802.01E).
129. The NYSE and NASDAQ are for-profit and publicly traded. The Amex is
considering a change to for-profit status. Aaron Siegel, Amex Picks Morgan Stanley for
IPO, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20070125/REG/70125010/-1/BreakingNews04.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2007). A company must use the definition of the
exchange where it is traded, assuming the exchange requires that at least a majority of the
board be independent. Id. § 229.407(a)(1)(i). If the company is not traded on such an
exchange, it must pick a definition from one of the exchanges that does require a majority
of independent directors and disclose the choice. Id. § 229.407(a)(1)(ii).
131. In the absence of a separate audit committee, the entire board will be treated as
the audit committee. Id. § 229.407(a). The requirement applies in connection with a
proxy statement or annual report filed in connection with the election of directors. Id. §
229.407(d)(4)(i).
Certain narrow exceptions exist to the requirements.
Id. §
229.407(d)(4)(i)(C).
132. Id. § 229.407(c). The Commission has long required disclosure of the existence of
a nominating committee. See Shareholder Communications, supra note 20, at 355-56
(requiring disclosure of the existence of a nominating committee, the policy on whether
shareholders could nominate new directors, and the process for submission of nominees).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e). Companies without one of these three committees must
disclose all the non-independent directors on the entire board. Id. § 229.407(a) ("If the
registrant does not have a separately designated audit, nominating or compensation
committee or committee performing similar functions, the registrant must provide the

2007]

The Limits of Disclosure

These requirements altered the compliance calculation. Violations of
the rules of the exchange previously raised few enforcement concerns.
Transforming them into disclosure requirements implicated the rules of
the Exchange Act. The Commission could bring actions against
companies for violations of the periodic reporting requirements.'3 In
addition, shareholders and investors could bring actions for
misstatements about compliance with listing standards, whether under
the general antifraud provisions or the proxy rules."'
The requirements are of recent vintage and their impact on compliance
remains uncertain. The Commission is unlikely to target the area. As for
private actions, plaintiffs need to meet all of the elements of the
antifraud provision, including the requirements of scienter, materiality,
and damages.136 In many instances, actions alleging inaccurate disclosure

disclosure of directors that are not independent with respect to all members of the board
of directors applying such committee independence standards.").
134. See, e.g., Walt Disney Co., supra note 79, at 1832 (emphasizing the need for
"scrupulous adherence to the disclosure requirements" in an action against the Walt
Disney Company for violations).
135. See J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) ("It appears clear that
private parties have a right under § 27 [of the Securities Exchange Act] to bring suit for
violation of § 14(a) of the Act."); Minzer v. Keegan, 218 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000)
("There is an implied private right of action under Rule 14a-9."); Koppel v. 4987 Corp.,
167 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the "private right of action under Rule 14a-9
is well established"); see also Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 1984)
(finding that a private cause of action exists under Rule 14a-8); Haas v. Wieboldt Stores,
Inc., 725 F.2d 71, 73 (7th Cir. 1984) (same as to Rule 14a-7); Ash v. GAF Corp., 723 F.2d
1090, 1092-94 (3d Cir. 1983) (same as to Rule 14a-3). The issue is so settled that one court
characterized the argument that a private right of action did not exist under Rule 14a-6 as
"unbelievably specious." Lynch v. Fulks, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
f 97,831, at 90,132 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 1980). But see Pundaleeka v. Fidelity Brokerage
Servs., Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,905, at 93,820-21 (N.D.
I11.May 27, 1999) (no private right of action under section 14(b) for failure of broker to
forward materials from company to beneficial owner); Scattergood v. Perelman, No. 903451, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9246, at *17 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1990), affid in part and rev'd in
part, 945 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1991) (district court finding no private right of action under
Rule 14a-13, but Third Circuit refusing to decide the issue on appeal).
136. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78q (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). Violations of the proxy
rules only require a showing of negligence. See Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir.
1973); Bond Opportunity Fund v. Unilab Corp., [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 92,418, at 92,115 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2003), affid, [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) $1 92,683 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 2004) ("Although the Supreme Court has
reserved decision on whether scienter is necessary for liability under § 14(a), the lower
courts generally have held that the plaintiffs need prove only negligence when seeking to
impose liability under that section and Rule 14a-9." (citation omitted)); Andrx Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,803, 80 SEC Docket 394, 398 (May 6, 2003) ("No showing of
scienter is required to establish a violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act or Rule
14a-9 thereunder."). The Sixth Circuit has required scienter in a 14a-9 action, but only in
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of listing standards will founder on these elements)37 When combined
with other disclosure issues, however, they may remain important
components in a broader fraud suit against the company.13
The corporate governance disclosure requirements also highlight a
central weakness in the Commission's entire approach to the area.
Disclosure of compliance is only as good as the quality of the underlying
standards. Because the definition of independent adopted by the SROs
does not ensure that the directors are in fact independent, the disclosure
requirements may actually mislead shareholders into believing that a
company in fact has an independent board.
B. Disclosureand Limits on CEO Influence
The Commission went beyond compliance with listing standards.
Additional disclosure requirements were intended to influence behavior
by increasing the transparency of the decision making process at the
board level.
With respect to compensation decisions, the rules initially required
companies to include a report of the compensation committee in the
proxy statement."' The report had to include the criteria used in making
awards and the policies for determining the CEO's compensation. '40 In
particular, the report had to include a specific discussion of the
relationship • between
the CEO's performance and his or her
141
compensation.
Although the Commission disclaimed any intent to change substantive
behavior,14 the provision was intended
to do exactly that, something not
lost on commentators to the rule. 143 With
the increased disclosure
connection with the liability of corporate outsiders. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623
F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1980).
137. See, e.g., Adams, 623 F.2d at 436 (reversing district court judgment for plaintiff
shareholders because they failed to show that defendant company's error was material);
Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1307 (finding damages awarded to be too severe).
138. For example, the Commission requires the CEO and CFO of a company to certify
all financial statements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14. Consequently, any statements made in
the certification may themselves be the basis for liability. See, e.g., Limantour v. Cray Inc.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 1129,1158-60 (W.D. Wash. 2006).

139. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962,
Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, at 48,126-27 (Oct. 21, 1992).
140. Id. at 48,127.
141. Id. at 48,138.
142. Id. ("The disclosure does not impose new fiduciary standards on directors, or
require any particular actions or procedures.").
143. See id. ("While shareholders expressed great enthusiasm for the report, the
corporate community and practicing bar raised substantial concerns. Some argued that
the report was an undue intrusion into the internal affairs of the company and interfered
with the operation of the state-law business judgment rule; others argued that the report
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requirements, boards presumably would be less inclined to pay an
amount simply because it was desired by the CEO, and would instead
base compensation decisions on objective criteria.
Almost from the very beginning, however, the reports proved
uninformative, telling little about the actual process of arriving at
compensation decisions.'" The Commission ultimately abandoned the
approach, replacing the report with something resembling management's
discussion and analysis (MD&A). 145

The compensation committee

merely had to disclose that it reviewed management's analysis and4
recommended to the board that it be included in the requisite filing.'
There has already
been concern that this requirement may devolve into
4
boilerplate.

1

With respect to the nomination of directors, the proxy statement must
148
disclose the method used to identify and evaluate director nominees.
This includes identifying the source of the nominee by category, with the
categories encompassing "security holder, non-management director,
chief executive officer, other executive officer, third-party search firm, or
other, specified source, 149 and the function of any firm hired to "identify

would interfere unduly with the functioning of the Committee and would deter people
from serving as directors.").
144. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 32,723, 58
Fed. Reg. 42,882, at 48,883 (Aug. 12, 1993) ("[M]ore than 5,000 registrants filed their
annual meeting proxy statements containing the new compensation disclosure.... Overall,
the registrants' disclosures under the new rules were quite good. However, the quality of
the compensation committee reports varied considerably.").
145. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act
Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,444A, 88 SEC Docket 2353, 2357 (Aug. 29, 2006) (requiring compensation
disclosure to be based on "the material factors underlying compensation policies and
decisions reflected in the data presented in the tables").
146. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(5)(i) (2007).
147. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, supra note 145, at
2363 ("The Compensation Discussion and Analysis should reflect the individual
circumstances of a company and should avoid boilerplate disclosure.").
148. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2); id. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (requiring disclosure of "any
differences in the manner in which the nominating committee evaluates nominees for
director based on whether the nominee is recommended by a security holder"); see also
Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions, Securities Act Release No. 8340,
Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 81 SEC
Docket 2135, 2137 (Nov. 24, 2003) ("Disclosure as to whether and how [security holders]
may participate in a company's nomination process, and the manner in which their
candidates are evaluated, including differences between how their candidates and how
other candidates are evaluated, therefore, represents important information for security
holders.").
149. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions, supra note 148, at
2139; see also id. at 2141 ("In disclosing the category of persons or entities that initially
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150

or evaluate" potential nominees.
The disclosure extends to shareholder nominees. The company must
151
reveal any policies regarding the consideration of these nominees
including the procedures for submission."' The company must disclose
any minimum qualifications, including any specific qualities or skills
deemed necessary by the committee, 53 and to the extent a nominee
comes from a shareholder with more than five percent of the voting
stock, the company should identify the shareholder (or group of
shareholders), the nominee, and the board's decision with respect to the
nomination. 4 The company is not, however, required to disclose the

recommended a candidate to the nominating committee, companies should ensure that
they identify also any person or entity that caused a particular candidate to be
recommended. For example, if the chief executive officer asks a third party to evaluate a
potential candidate, and that third party ultimately recommends the candidate to the
nominating committee, both the chief executive officer and the third party should be
identified as recommending parties in the company's disclosure. We have provided for
disclosure of more than one type of source for a nominee to address the possibility of
multiple sources.").
150. Id. at 2139.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(ii). The policy may be a simple as a statement that the
committee "will consider director candidates recommended by security holders." Id. If
no such policy exists, an explanation of "the basis for the view" must be provided. Id. §
229.407(c)(2)(iii).
152. Id. § 229.407(c)(2)(iv). Material changes to those procedures also must be
disclosed. Id. § 229.407(c)(3). Changes need only appear in a quarterly or annual report.
Id. § 229.407(c)(3) instruction 1.
153. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions, supranote 148, at 213839; see also id. at 2141 ("Many commenters that supported the disclosure requirements
suggested that we expand the requirements to require companies to disclose the extent to
which they take into consideration diversity, in particular race and gender, in nominating
candidates, We have not included such a requirement in the standards we are adopting
today, as we believe this particular consideration, as well as other considerations made by
a company, will likely be addressed adequately by the new disclosure item requiring
companies to disclose their criteria for considering board candidates. Further, we do not
view it as appropriate to identify any specific criteria that a company must address in
describing the qualities it looks for in board candidates." (footnote omitted)).
154. Id. at 2139; see also id. at 2137 ("Finally, an additional, specific disclosure
requirement regarding the treatment of candidates put forward by large security holders
or groups of security holders that have a long-term investment interest is appropriate, as it
will provide investors with information that is useful in assessing the actions of the
nominating committee."). Disclosure need not occur unless the group of shareholders and
the identified candidate both provide written consent. See id. at 2139. As the instructions
indicate, this is an affirmative requirement imposed on the shareholder group. See id. at
2143 ("The company would not be obligated to request such materials where a security
holder or group does not otherwise provide their consent and proof of ownership."). The
Commission has also proposed, but never adopted, a rule that would permit large
shareholders to insert nominees into management's proxy statements. See Security
Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company
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reasons for rejecting a nominee.155
The disclosure of the process used to identify nominees was ostensibly
designed to increase transparency.'56 In fact, the approach was meant to
encourage consideration of shareholder nominees and reveal the role of
the CEO in the process. 5 7 Neither is likely to result from the disclosure
requirements. Nothing in the disclosure process requires substantive
consideration of shareholder nominees or prevents the nomination
committee from seeking opinions from the CEO with respect to a
nominee.
C. Disclosureand SOX

Other disclosure requirements center around the obligations imposed
in the aftermath of the adoption of SOX. With the exception of officer
certification and financial expertise, the portions of SOX addressing
governance do not rely on disclosure.
They impose substantive
obligations (although not all of a self-executing nature) that range from
an assessment of internal controls, to an increase in authority of the audit
committee, to the adoption of a stricter definition of independent
director.15
The Commission added to this regime an overlay of
disclosure largely centering on compliance with the new requirements. 9

Act Release No. 26,206, 81 SEC Docket 770, 770 (Oct. 14, 2003). Because it was highly
controversial, no action was ever taken on the proposal.
155. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions, supra note 148, at 2143
("[T]he disclosure standard that we are adopting today does not include the proposed
requirement that companies disclose the specific reasons for not nominating a candidate..
. . While not required, a company could, of course, choose to explain why it did not
nominate one or all of the security holder-recommended candidates.").
156. Id. at 2136 ("This enhanced disclosure is intended to provide security holders with
additional, specific information upon which to evaluate the boards of directors and
nominating committees of the companies in which they invest. Further, we intend that
increased transparency of the nomination process will make that process more
understandable to security holders.").
157. See Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, supra note 99, at
297 ("[I]nformation relating to nominating committees would be important to
shareholders because a nominating committee can, over time, have a significant impact on
the composition of the board and also can improve the director selection process by
increasing the range of candidates under consideration and intensifying the scrutiny given
to their qualifications. Additionally, the Commission believes that the institution of
nominating committees can represent a significant step in increasing shareholder
participation in the corporate electoral process, a subject which the Commission will
consider further in connection with its continuing proxy rule re-examination.").
158. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 301, 404, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m)(2)-(3), 7262
(Supp. V 2005).
159. See generally 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2007).
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Section 301 of SOX addresses audit committees,

6

with listing

16
The
standards employed as the mechanism for implementation. '
162
auditor.
independent
the
and
fire
hire
to
the
right
committees have
The committee also must consist entirely of independent directors, with
3
SOX containing a unique definition. 16 SOX also requires disclosure of
audit committee1
the
of
members
the
of
expertise
financial
The Commission adopted a rule prohibiting exchanges from listing any
165
with SOX.
company that lacks an audit committee in compliance

Designed "to enhance the independence of the audit function, thereby
' 66
Rule 1OA-3 requires
furthering the objectivity of financial reporting,'
the appointment,
for
responsible
"directly
that the committee be
auditor, and the
outside
compensation, retention and oversight" of the
' 67
This includes
firm "must report directly to the audit committee.'
16
' As the
and
terms.
hiring, firing, and the setting of all engagement fees

160. The term "audit committee" is defined in section 3(a)(58) of the Exchange Act
and consists of a committee (or, in the absence of a committee, the entire board) created
"for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the
issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(58)(A)
(Supp. V 2005).
161. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m); see also S. REP. No.
107-205, at 23-24 (2002) ("Witnesses at the Committee's hearings suggested that the
auditing process may be compromised when auditors view their main responsibility as
serving the company's management rather than its full board of directors or its audit
committee. For this reason, the bill requires audit committees to be directly responsible
for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of auditors, and requires
auditors to report directly to the audit committee.").
162. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2); see also S. REP. NO.
107-205, at 24.
163. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A)-(B) ("In order to
be considered ... independent ... a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not,
other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of
directors, or any other board committee-(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any
subsidiary thereof."); see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 24-25.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 7265.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(a)(1)-(2) (2007).
166. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 2888.
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2); see also Standards Relating to Listed Company
Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 2888.
168. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 288889 ("In addition to services necessary to perform an audit or review in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ('GAAS'), [the scope of services performed by an
auditor and overseen by an audit committee] also may include services that generally only
the independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort letters, statutory
audits, attest services, consents and assistance with and review of documents filed with the
Commission." (footnote omitted)).
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Commission has noted, the authority will "help to align the auditor's
interests with those of shareholders."1 69
The Commission also requires that the audit committee "have the
authority to engage independent counsel and other advisors" as
necessary. Companies also "must provide for appropriate funding, as
determined by the audit committee," including ordinary administrative
expenses."
It must maintain a system for receiving, retaining, and
treating complaints from the auditor and 172
employees

7

that permits

confidential submissions to protect anonymity.
Members also must meet a stricter definition of independent than
those serving on other committees."' Rule 1OA-3 prohibits a member
from being an affiliate of the issuer or from accepting "directly or

169. Id. at 2888. The committee may be given other functions. See, e.g., Statoil,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,599, 89 SEC Docket 283, 286 (Oct. 13, 2006) (requiring an
"independent compliance consultant" to report possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to the audit committee).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(4)-(5). Advisors may include those with expertise in
"accounting, financial reporting or legal matters," and may be needed to provide advice
"necessary to identify potential conflicts of interest and assess the company's disclosure
and other compliance obligations with an independent and critical eye." Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 2892. The advisors may
also need to "independently investigate questions that may arise regarding financial
reporting and compliance with the securities laws." Id. The Commission did not set limits
on funding, apparently accepting the view that this is sufficiently controlled by the
fiduciary obligations of directors on the committee. See id. at 2893 ("These commenters
argued that audit committee members' own fiduciary duties to the issuer and natural
oversight by the board of directors as a whole over the audit committee would address any
concerns over abuse. The final rule does not set funding limits."); see also S. REP. No.
107-205, at 25 (2002) ("Comptroller General Walker agreed that audit committee
members must be 'adequately resourced,' suggesting that audit committee members 'may
need their own staff."').
171. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (Supp. V 2005); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(3).
172. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 2891.
In requiring systems for employee complaints, the Commission recognized that
"[m]anagement may not have the appropriate incentives to self-report all questionable
practices" and that employees often fear "management reprisal." Id. The Commission
declined to proscribe specific complaint procedures. See id. ("The procedures that will be
most effective to meet the requirements for a very small listed issuer with few employees
could be very different from the processes and systems that would need to be in place for
large, multi-national corporations with thousands of employees in many different
jurisdictions. We do not believe that in this instance a 'one-size-fits-all' approach would
be appropriate.").
173. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1). The rule contains certain exceptions to the
independence requirements. See id § 240.10a-3(b)(1)(iv). Any reliance on an exception
must be disclosed. See id. § 240.10a-3(d).
174. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii)(B); see also id. § 240.10A-3(e)(1) (2007) (defining the
term affiliate).
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indirectly"
any fee175 other
plas1 6 odietrs
171than fixed compensation under retirement
plans or director's fees.
Indirect fees include those paid to certain
family members1 78 or to businesses providing "accounting,
consulting,
,179
legal, investment banking or financial advisory services.
The Commission added layers of disclosure to these substantive
requirements, including whether the financial statements were discussed
with management and the independent auditors.'O Other provisions

175. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii)(A). The Commission specifically rejected a de minimis
exception for payments to directors. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees, supra note 80, at 2884. ("[G]iven the narrow class of services covered by the
final rule, the lack of a de minimis exception should be less necessary. Moreover, if the
level of compensation that the member or associated entity receives is truly de minimis
and immaterial, we are not persuaded that requiring an issuer to locate another provider
so that the member can remain qualified for audit committee service would be overly
burdensome.").
176. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, supra note 80, at 2883
& n.57 ("The requirement that the compensation be fixed precludes retirement payments
that are tied to the continued performance of the relevant entity. The requirement that
the compensation be fixed does not preclude customary objectively determined
adjustment provisions such as cost of living adjustments.").
177. See id. at 2882 n.46 ("The final rule does not specify any limits or restrictions on
fees paid for capacity as a member of the board of directors or any board committee.");
see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 24 (2002).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(8) (describing indirect fees as those paid to "a spouse, a
minor child or stepchild or a child or stepchild sharing a home with the member").
179. See id. (further describing indirect fees as those paid to "an entity in which such
member is a partner, member, [or] an officer . . . and which provides accounting,
consulting, legal, investment banking or financial advisory services to the issuer or any
subsidiary of the issuer"); see also Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees, supra note 80, at 2882-83 ("Other commercial relationships are not covered
by the final rule, although,... we expect that SROs will contain restrictions on additional
services and activities in their own listing standards. For example, the prohibitions in
Exchange Act Rule 1OA-3 do not include non-advisory financial services such as lending,
check clearing, maintaining customer accounts, stock brokerage services or custodial and
cash management services." (footnote omitted)).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(3)(i)(A)-(B). The names of the committee members must
appear immediately below this disclosure. Id. § 229.407(d)(3)(ii). The committee must
include a report that discloses whether it has received the disclosures required by
Independence Standards Board Standard No. 1. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(3)(i)(C); see also
INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BD. STANDARD No. 1 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd.), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Interim-Standards/IndependenceStandards/ISB1.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). The report must also disclose whether it
discussed with the independent accountants the matters required to be discussed by the
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(3)(i)(B); see also AUDIT
COMM. COMMC'NS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2007), available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/AU00380A.pdf. In addition, the report must disclose that the committee reviewed the
financial statements with management and the independent auditors and recommended
that the financial statements be included in the annual report. Id. § 229.407(d)(3)(i)(D).
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require disclosure if any director does not meet the independence
requirements."" With respect to financial experts, the Commission
defined the 3term.. 2 and required disclosure of the person designated as
the expert,' or an explanation as to why the committee included no such
expert. ' 84
The Commission coupled the disclosure requirements with increased
enforcement.
The Commission brought an action against the
chairperson of an audit committee that improperly recommended that
the company not file an annual report on a timely basis.185 Similarly, the
Commission sanctioned a company that misrepresented the status of an
internal investigation and the conclusions of the audit committee.'86 In
another instance, the Commission required the audit committee to retain
The report, therefore, does not explore the decision making process as much as it requires
disclosure of the process used in reviewing the financial statements.
181. In the absence of a committee, the entire board will be treated as the audit
committee. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(58) (Supp. V 2005) (defining audit committee). This
requirement applies to proxy statements or annual reports filed in connection with the
election of directors. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(4). Certain narrow exceptions exist to the
requirements. See id. § 229.407(d)(4)(i)(C).
182. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(ii).
183. Audit committees must disclose the existence of a financial expert on the
committee, including the name of the individual and whether he or she qualifies as
independent based upon the relevant listing standard. Id. § 229.407(d)(5)(i)(A)-(B). The
designation does not automatically qualify the individual as an expert under the securities
laws-including for purposes of section 11 of the Securities Act-or increase that
director's duties or obligations. See id. § 229.407(d)(5)(iv)(A)-(B) ("The designation or
identification of a person as an audit committee financial expert pursuant to this Item 407
does not impose on such person any duties, obligations or liability that are greater than the
duties, obligations and liability imposed on such person as a member of the audit
committee and board of directors in the absence of such designation or identification.").
Similarly, the presence of someone with the requisite expertise does not change the
responsibilities of the other directors. See id. § 229.407(d)(5)(iv)(C) ("The designation or
identification of a person as an audit committee financial expert pursuant to this Item does
not affect the duties, obligations or liability of any other member of the audit committee
or board of directors.").
184. Id. § 229.407(d)(5)(i)(C). The rules of the NYSE require at least one member to
have accounting or financial expertise. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §
303A.07(a) commentary (2004) ("Each member of the audit committee must be
financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company's board in its
business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time
after his or her appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of
the audit committee must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as
the company's board interprets such qualification in its business judgment."). The
definition of financial expert for purposes of Item 407 is much more specific. See supra
note 183.
185. Hansen, Exchange Act Release No. 54,689, 89 SEC Docket 604, 605-06 (Nov. 2,
2006).
186. SEC v. Endocare, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,772, 88 SEC Docket 1593, 1593

(C.D. Cal. July 25, 2006).
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independent
counsel and defined the committee's role in the disclosure
187
process.
This disclosure increases the legal risks for directors on the audit
committee."' It also provides a mechanism for private enforcement'f 9
SOX only mandated the implementation of the audit committee
requirements through the vehicle of listing standards.'9 By requiring
disclosure of conformity with various requirements, particularly the
independent director requirement, the Commission created a potential
enforcement avenue that went well beyond the stock exchanges.
IV. THE SEC AND SUBSTANTIVE BEHAVIOR

At this point, a number of observations can be made about the role of
the Commission in the corporate governance process.
First, the
separation of substantive standards of corporate governance and
disclosure is the product of an historical anomaly, not a reasoned division
of authority. Second, the separation of substance and disclosure in and
of itself contributed to the race to the bottom and the weakening of state
law fiduciary standards.
Third, in adopting the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act, Congress
was not trying to reserve a discrete niche for the Commission but to solve
what it perceived as the most severe governance problems. Disclosure
was seen as an appropriate means of addressing the problems of selfperpetuation and excessive compensation.
Fourth, the declining
standards under state law have made Commission intrusion into the
governance process inevitable, primarily to ensure the efficacy of the
disclosure process and secondarily to empower shareholders. Arguments
about whether the Commission should play a significant role in the
governance process, therefore, are beside the point. It already does.
Fifth, the Commission was initially content to eschew direct oversight
and leave regulation of governance to others, particularly the stock
187. See Coca-Cola Company, Securities Release Act No. 8569, Exchange Act Release
No. 51,565, 85 SEC Docket 601, 606-07 (Apr. 18, 2005) (requiring the audit committee to
take several actions to enhance the disclosure process at the management level within the
company).
188. Given the absence of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5, the antifraud
prohibition only extends to primary violators. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 179 (1994), superseded in part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f)
(2000), as recognized in Trs. of Boston Univ. v. ASM Commc'ns., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 66
(D. Mass. 1998). See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The more involved someone is in
the actual disclosure process, the more likely they will meet this definition.
189. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179 (discussing private rights of action under the
Exchange Acts).
190. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A) (Supp. V

2005).
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exchanges. With that approach upended by the D.C. Circuit in Business
Roundtable, the Commission shifted toward direct regulation, with
disclosure as the primary mechanism used to alter behavior. The use of
disclosure to regulate substance, however, creates anomalies and
problems.
Sixth, the traditional state of affairs has largely been upended by
SOX.' 9' The Act interjected the Commission more deeply into the
governance process, partly through the regulation of audit committees
and partly through the authority to assign specific duties and obligations
in connection with the development of internal controls.
With the ongoing race to the bottom, the use of disclosure as a means
of influencing behavior has, however, struck limits. Disclosure works
best where it relates to a preexisting substantive right and creates the
specter of increased legal attention. The disclosure of conflicts of
interest by fiduciaries represents an example. In those circumstances,
officer and director behavior can be influenced through increased
disclosure.
In the absence of strong underlying legal obligations, the use of
disclosure as a tool to regulate substantive behavior is far less effective.
It is true that the threat of embarrassment may have an affect on
behavior.'
Embarrassment, however, only goes so far.'
A director
may not appreciate public disclosure of the fact that he or she missed a
large number of board meetings, but in the end it is unlikely to result in a
resignation, leaving shareholders with little recourse.
At most, it
imposes modest pressure to attend more meetings the following year.
The disclosure requirements can also be counterproductive. For
instance, disclosure may produce a wealth of complicated but ultimately
191.

See Jeffrey Y. Wu, Essay, Revisiting Business Roundtable and Section 19(c) in the

Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 249, 251 (2006) ("With corporate
governance regulation now itself an essential component of the Exchange Act's anti-fraud
regime, it is no longer tenable to take the position, as Business Roundtable did, that
corporate governance regulation is beyond the purview of the Exchange Act.").
192. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's
Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 453-54 (2001) ("The

compensation disclosure requirements of Item 402 reveal one place where the
Commission has plainly tried to have an effect on primary behavior, with almost a
'shaming' objective as compensation measures are displayed adjacent to performance
results. Whether this works is another question entirely; it has as likely fueled the upward
spiral in salaries as operated as a check. . . . [Hluman nature responds differently to
disclosure rules than we often predict." (footnotes omitted)).
193. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
BehavioralFoundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1741-42 (2001).
194. But see Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive
Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005) ("[Directors] do not like to be made the

object of public scorn and ridicule.").
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unimportant information. Moreover, disclosure may have unintended
consequences. There has been speculation that detailed disclosure of
executive compensation actually accelerated the upward trend in
compensation. 9 5
Indeed, disclosure requirements themselves have
probably contributed to the continued race to the bottom.196
One response would be to leave things exactly where they are.
Delaware will continue to minimize the responsibilities of directors and
officers while the Commission will continue to impose increasingly
complex disclosure obligations. Internal accountability will largely be a
case-by-case determination and the role of the directors in the disclosure
process will continue to be minimal. Another possibility would be an
increase in Commission authority, acceding to the agency the right to
regulate directly substantive behavior. 9 7 To some degree, SOX took this
approach. 19'
There is, however, a middle ground where the Commission can
increase its role in the governance process with existing regulatory
authority and, at a minimum, ensure greater effectiveness of the
disclosure process.
This approach would, however, require a
fundamental shift in agency thinking.
The Commission would
philosophically need to move away from disclosure as its primary
regulatory mission in favor of more direct involvement in the governance
process.
What might the Commission do? Two possibilities come to mind.
First, the Commission could use existing authority to fix problems of
state law by making aspects of the securities laws contingent upon
improved governance. Second, it could use newly granted authority
under section 404 of SOX to increase the direct responsibilities of boards
of directors in the governance area.

195. See Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won't Tame C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2006, at Cl. See generally Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 757 (2007).
196. By forcing boards to justify certain decisions, disclosure requirements are likely to
push Delaware courts to find compliance with fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., In re J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 823 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d
766 (Del. 2006) (relying on NYSE definition of independence to conclude that a director
was independent under state law).
197. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance,45
ALA. L. REV. 783, 784-85 (1994) ("I propose that the Securities Act of 1933 be amended
to authorize the Commission to condition the availability of certain simplified methods of
issuing securities under the Act on the existence of an independent board.").
198. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (Supp. V 2005) ("The Commission shall promulgate
such rules and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, and in furtherance of this Act."); see also Wu, supra note 191,
at 258 (discussing SOX's audit committee provisions).
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A. FederalDefinition of Independent Director

One of the areas of failed governance concerns the definition of
independent director. Neither the definition under Delaware law nor the
one used by the SROs adequately controls the types of relationships that
could impair independence. 99 SOX improved the definition in
connection with audit committee membership but did not fix all of the
weaknesses. 20 Moreover, the exchanges have proved unwilling to extend
the SOX definition to the remainder of the directors on the board.
Companies must disclose the directors who meet the definition of
independent. 2° Moreover, they often adopt standards requiring the
board to have a higher percentage of independent directors than is
202
required by the exchanges. All of this projects an image of a board that
can act in a neutral manner. But in fact, this is often misleading. The
disclosure merely reflects compliance with a definition that does not at
all ensure independence or neutrality.
The Commission could adopt its own definition, one stricter and more
likely to ensure independence, entitling companies that meet the
definition to regulatory benefits. It is not a fanciful suggestion. The issue
came up in connection with amendments to Rule 14d-10, the all holders
rule adopted under the Williams Act.20' The amendments provide a safe
harbor from the best price rule for compensation approved by a
In effect, the Commission
committee of independent directors. 2°
determined that the securities laws benefited from reliance on
independent director approval.
The Commission could have conditioned application of the safe harbor
on its own definition. Had it done so, public companies would have been
encouraged to include directors who met the definition. Despite some
the Commission opted to rely on the
calling for this approach,

199. The deficiencies at state law are chronicled in Brown, supra note 2. For problems
with the NYSE definition, see supra notes 122-124, and accompanying text.
200. See Brown, supra note 2, at 99-100.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2007).
202. See Letter from Anne M. Mulcahy, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable Corporate
Governance Task Force, to Nancy Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, at 3
(Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-77.pdf (noting
that ninety percent of companies belonging to Business Roundtable have boards that are
at least eighty percent independent).
203. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10.
204. Id. § 240.14d-10(d)(2). The same safe harbor applied to the issuer tender offer
rule. See id. § 240.13e-4.
205. Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
54,684, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,542, 89 SEC Docket 576, 585 (Nov. 1,
2006).
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definitions of independent used by the stock exchanges.2 O As the agency
explained:
Other commentators suggested that codifying an independence
definition similar to other definitions provided in some
Exchange Act rules-as opposed to relying upon a definition
that is determined by reference to the listing standards, as we
have in other Exchange Act rules-would be a better approach
because this would provide a consistent definition. We disagree
and are adopting the provisions related to the independence
standards as proposed, with an accommodation for foreign
We believe this approach is appropriate
private issuers.
because the definitions under the listing standards have
previously been approved by us and are consistent with the
207
approach we have followed in the pasti.
The Commission, therefore, receded from the opportunity to adopt its
own rule. It has similarly done so in the context of articulating rules with
208
respect to the assessment of internal controls.
The hesitancy is understandable. Providing a federal definition crosses
a Rubicon and directly competes with the exchanges and state law.
Moreover, crafting a workable, effective definition of independent
director is by no means an easy task.
Nonetheless, if the Commission expects to see benefits in the
disclosure process as a result of director independence, it must accept the
fact that the existing definitions will not accomplish the task. Efforts
should be made to improve the definition or to refrain from deferring to
definitions that do not in fact ensure independence. At a minimum, the
206. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(d)(2) instruction 1 ("If the bidder or subject company,
as applicable, is a listed issuer (as defined in § 240.10A-3 of this chapter) whose securities
are listed. .. on a national securities exchange... that has independence requirements for
compensation committee members that have been approved by the Commission (as those
requirements may be modified or supplemented), apply the bidder's or subject company's
definition of independence that it uses for determining that the members of the
compensation committee are independent in compliance with the listing standards
applicable to compensation committee members of the listed issuer."). Essentially the
same definition is included in id. § 240.13e-4(f)(12) instruction 1.
207. Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rules, supra note 205, at 585
(footnote omitted).
208. See Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting,
Securities Act Release No. 8762, Exchange Act Release No. 54,976, 89 SEC Docket 1639,
1655 n.78 (Dec. 20, 2006) ("If no audit committee exists, all references to the audit
committee apply to the entire board of directors of the company. When a company is not
required by law or applicable listing standards to have independent directors on its audit
committee, the lack of independent directors at these companies is not indicative, by itself,
of a control deficiency. In all cases, management should interpret the terms 'board of
directors' and 'audit committee' as being consistent with provisions for the use of those
terms as defined in relevant SEC rules.").
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Commission is in a position to apply the definition of independent that
arises out of SOX rather than the more generic definition used by the
exchanges 2.
To the extent progress is not made, federal intervention remains a risk.
This is what occurred in connection with the independence standards for
auditors. Prior to the adoption of SOX, the Commission had genuine
concerns about the independence issue. The concerns arose in large part
210
because of economic ties that potentially impaired neutrality.
Commission reforms, however, were too tepid. Congress stepped in and
imposed a far more dramatic set of reforms in SOX, essentially
separating consulting and auditing functions in order to enhance the
independence of the company's auditors.
B. SOX and Accountability
The other potential area of Commission involvement in the
governance process concerns accountability. SOX went beyond the caseby-case method used by the Commission and identified specific persons
responsible for the disclosure process.
The Act assigned specific
responsibilities to the audit committee, the independent auditors, and the
top executive officers."' Most importantly, however, the Act identified
those responsible for the process of formulating internal controls.
Most of this responsibility falls to the top officers. The CEO and CFO
must design (or oversee the design of), establish, and maintain internal
controls."' In addition, they must evaluate the effectiveness of the

209. The Commission has applied this definition once already. See 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(k)(1) (defining a qualified legal compliance committee as a committee that contains
one member of the issuer's audit committee, which would require that the director meet
the definition of independent under SOX). As a practical matter, this could be done by
requiring approval by the audit committee since these directors must already meet the
tougher definition contained in SOX. See supra note 163.
210. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 7919, Exchange Act Release No. 43,602, Investment Company
Act Release No. 24,744, 73 SEC Docket 1885, 1887 (Nov. 21, 2000) ("The amendments
identify certain relationships that render an accountant not independent of an audit client
under the standard in Rule 2-01(b). The relationships addressed include, among others,
financial, employment, and business relationships between auditors and audit clients, and
relationships between auditors and audit clients where the auditors provide certain nonaudit services to their audit clients.").
211. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m), 7213, 7241 (Supp. V 2005); see also S. REP. NO. 107205, at 2 (2002).
212. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)(i); see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25 ("The bill
therefore clearly establishes that CEOs and CFOs are responsible for the presentation of
material in their company's financial reports.").
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controls and2 13make the audit committee aware of any "significant
deficiencies.
SOX, however, goes even further, giving the Commission the authority
214
to specify the duties of particular individuals within a company.
Section 404(a) mandates an annual internal control report215 that
discloses the "responsibility of management for establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting; and . . . contain[s] an assessment . . . of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures [used]...
for financial reporting., 216 As the legislative history indicates, the
of management
provision was designed to increase the accountability
217
"for the financial representations of their companies.
With responsibility for much of the internal control process assigned
generally to "management," this term presumably can include the board
The provision,
of directors in addition to the CEO and CFO.
therefore, provides the Commission with the rulemaking authority to
impose specific obligations and duties on the board, at least with respect
to the development and supervision of internal controls.
The Commission has adopted some requirements in the area.2 19
"[I]nternal control over financial reporting" has been defined as a
213. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)(i); see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25 (The CEO and
CFO must certify that "financials and disclosures fairly present the company's operations
and financial condition.").
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262; see also Management's Report on Internal Control over
Financial Reporting, supra note 204, at 1640 ("Effective [internal control over financial
reporting (ICFR)] can also help companies deter fraudulent financial accounting practices
or detect them earlier and perhaps reduce their adverse effects. While controls are
susceptible to manipulation, especially in instances of fraud involving the collusion of two
or more people, including senior management, these are known limitations of internal
control systems. Therefore, it is possible to design ICFR to reduce, though not eliminate,
instances of fraud.").
215. 15 U.S.C. § 7262; see also Management's Report on Internal Control over
Financial Reporting, supra note 204, at 1640 ("The significance of Section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley is that it re-emphasizes the important relationship between the
maintenance of effective ICFR and the preparation of reliable financial statements.").
216. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
217. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25.
218. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7262; see also S. REP. No. 107-205, at 31 ("In order to
enhance the quality of reporting and increase investor confidence, the bill requires that
annual reports filed with the SEC must be accompanied by a statement by the
management of the issuer that management is responsible for creating and maintaining
adequate internal controls. Management must also present its assessment of the
effectiveness of those controls.").
219. See Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, supra
note 204, at 1640 ("Instead of providing specific guidance regarding the evaluation, we
expressed our belief that the methods of conducting evaluations of ICFR will, and should,
vary from company to company and will depend on the circumstances of the company and
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"process designed by, or under the supervision of, the issuer's principal
executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar
functions, and effected
by the issuer's board of directors, management
220
and other personnel.
The provision, therefore, not only codifies the responsibilities of the
CEO and CFO, but also contemplates a role for the board of directors,
although only to "effect" the process. The term encompasses some level
of oversight. 22' An interpretive release issued by the Commission notes
only the expectation that the board be "knowledgeable and informed"
about the assessment. 2 2 In addition, the audit committee must be told of
any significant deficiencies in the internal controls. 223
The requirements imposed on the board are admittedly vague.
Nonetheless, they directly regulate substantive behavior. Not left to
state law fiduciary obligations, the federal securities laws require
directors to remain informed about internal controls and problems with
internal controls. The failure to do so can result in sanctions, even if
there is no actual harm to the corporation.
Authority included in SOX, therefore, provides an avenue for
increased federal intrusion into the governance process.
The
Commission could, by rule, substantially increase the obligations of the
board in its oversight of the reporting process, particularly with respect

the significance of the controls. We continue to believe that it is impractical to prescribe a
single methodology that meets the needs of every company." (footnote omitted)).
220. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) (2007) (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 240.15d-15(f).
221. See Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting,
Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,068, 80 SEC Docket 1014, 1020 n.50 (June 5, 2003) ("[T]he
composition of a company's board and audit committee, and how the directors fulfill their
responsibilities related to the financial reporting process, are key aspects of the company's
control environment. An important element of the company's internal control over
financial reporting ... is the involvement of the board or audit committee in overseeing
the financial reporting process, including assessing the reasonableness of management's
accounting judgments and estimates and reviewing key filings with regulatory agencies."
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
222. See Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, supra
note 204, at 1645 n.40 ("Because management is responsible for maintaining effective
internal control over financial reporting, this proposed interpretive guidance does not
specifically address the role of the board of directors or audit committee in a company's
evaluation and assessment of ICFR. However, we would ordinarily expect a board of
directors or audit committee, as part of its oversight responsibilities for the company's
financial reporting, to be knowledgeable and informed about the evaluation process and
management's assessment, as necessary in the circumstances.").
223. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)(i); id. § 240.13a-14 (2007); id. § 240.15d-14. 17 C.F.R.;
see also Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, supra note
204, at 1654 n.74.
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to the maintenance of the internal controls, imposing duties where, under
state law, they hardly exist.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The system of corporate governance in the United States is not
optimal but Rube Goldberg-like: a product of path dependence resulting
from historical accident rather than deliberate design. Moreover, the
respective roles of the SEC and the states were largely defined in the
1930s. Much has changed since then, particularly as a result of the
continued race to the bottom. The Commission has come under
increased pressure to regulate substantive behavior under SOX, and
Congress is increasingly likely to further involve the Commission in the
224
governance process.
Where does this leave the Commission? The SEC needs to recognize
its role in the corporate governance process. In part this means accepting
the limits of disclosure and taking advantage of its rulemaking authority
to alter substantive behavior. As the Commission becomes more overtly
involved in the governance process, some general principals should guide
the approach.
A. Rule #1: Do No Harm

Whatever the level of involvement, the Commission should take care
not to make matters of governance worse. Yet it has harmed the
governance process in the past. For example, the proxy rules themselves
make it more difficult for shareholders to exercise their governance
rights. With the proxy process having supplanted the shareholder
221
meeting as the forum for the election of directors, the costs associated
224.

The most recent example is the House of Representatives' adoption of legislation

regarding advisory votes on executive compensation. See Shareholder Vote on Executive
Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (mandating an advisory vote by
shareholders on executive compensation and providing the Commission with rulemaking
authority). The provision essentially gives the Commission the authority to define,
through rulemaking, the precise matters subject to shareholder approval. If passed,
therefore, the Act would further interject the Commission into the substance of the
governance process.
225. The proxy process has largely supplanted the annual meeting as a vehicle for
exercising shareholder franchise. As one commentator stated: "It is well known that
proxy voting has become the dominant mode of shareholder decisionmaking in publicly
held corporations." Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the CorporateProxy Machinery, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (1970); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

1780-1970, at 94

(1970) ("[T]he core reality of stockholder suffrage in the big company lay in the use of
proxy machinery."); U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, 77TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 35 (Comm.
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with regulatory compliance make it prohibitive for most shareholders
to
226
meeting.
the
of
floor
the
from
matters
propose
or
directors
nominate
The Commission somewhat ameliorated this effect through the
adoption of Rule 14a-8, which allows shareholders • to .insert 227
proposals
into management's proxy statements in certain circumstances.
At the
same time, however, the rule excepted the nomination of directors,
The
among other important categories of shareholder proposals.2
courts have occasionally admonished the often narrow interpretation of
this rule.229
An example of the negative consequences of the proxy rules can be
seen from the battle for control of the board of directors of Take-Two
Interactive Software. The Company scheduled a shareholder meeting
for March 29, 2007. 23o A group of large investors owning more than
forty-six percent of the voting shares decided to run an opposition slate
of directors. 21' Rather than engage in a proxy solicitation and incur the
necessary expense and delay, the shareholders simply nominated
232
candidates at the meeting.
The only regulatory filings were Schedule

Print 1941) ("[O]wnership of securities is so widely diffused that voting by stockholders in
corporate meetings is today effected almost entirely by proxies ....
"); Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, 2007 SEC LEXIS 1651, at *9 (July 27, 2007)
("Our regulations have been designed to facilitate the corporate proxy process so that it
functions, as nearly as possible, as a replacement for an actual, in-person gathering of
security holders, thus enabling security holders 'to control the corporate as effectively as
they might have by attending a shareholder meeting."' (quoting Bus. Roundtable v. SEC,
905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
226. Perhaps recognizing these difficulties, the Commission has taken a number of
steps designed to reduce the costs of solicitations, including the right to distribute proxy
materials over the Internet. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16.
227. See id. § 240.14a-8.
228. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (providing a company with authority to exclude a
shareholder proposal if it relates "to an election for membership on the company's board
of directors or analogous governing body"). In fact, the Commission has gradually
changed its position with respect to many topics sought to be included in shareholder
proposals.
229. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc.,
462 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2006); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 679
(D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). Proposals to mitigate this consequence
have gone nowhere. See Notice of Solicitation of Public Views, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,778, 80 SEC Docket 248 (May 1, 2003) (soliciting public comment on reform of the
proxy process in connection with the election of directors).
230. See Press Release, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., Take-Two Interactive
Software, Inc. Announces Results of Annual Meeting (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://ir.take2games.com/print-release.cfm?releaseid=235982.
231. Angela Pruitt & Kaja Whitehouse, Take-Two Holders Succeed in Board Coup,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2007, at A3.
232. Id.
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13Ds that revealed the existence of the group and the plan to replace
233
management.
By not using the proxy rules, the insurgents were able to maintain
stealth and avoid cost.21 When management learned of the shareholders'
plans on March 7, there
was
little it could do to counter the voting
•
235
strength of the insurgents.
As a result, the insurgents took over the
board, electing six directors. 236 At the same time, the insurgent
shareholders did not circulate a proxy statement containing the
background information on their candidates or allow the other
237

shareholders to participate.
The Commission, therefore, should recognize the dynamics caused by
the imposition of its own regulations on the governance process. Recent
efforts by the Commission suggest that this is not a lesson that will come
easily to the agency. After the Second Circuit's decision in the American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. American
International Group case striking down the staff's interpretation of the
238
exclusion of proposals that "relate to the election" of directors, the
Commission issued two rule proposals designed to clarify any
uncertainty."' The one ultimately adopted gave management the right to
exclude bylaw proposals that would sometimes require companies to
include shareholder nominees in the proxy statement. 24° By forcing
shareholders seeking the adoption of these bylaws to incur the costs of
proxy solicitation, the Commission effectively denied them rights that
exist under state law. In other words, the Commission intervened into
233. The Takeover of Take-Two: The Contested Election, The Race to the Bottom,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/shareholder-rights/the-takeover-of-take-two-thecontested-election.html (Apr. 5, 2007, 06:13 MST).
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. Pruitt & Whitehouse, supra note 227.
237. See id.
238. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, 462 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2006).
239. See generally Shareholder Proposals, supra note 225 (proposing amendments to
shareholder proposal rules). For detailed comment letters on these proposals see
generally Letter from Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr. and Visiting Associate Professor
Sandeep Gopalan, theRacetotheBottom.org, University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
to Nancy Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-592.pdf,
and Letter from Professor J.
Robert Brown, Jr., theRacetotheBottom.org, University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
to Nancy Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-16.pdf.
240. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,914, 2007 SEC LEXIS 2845, at *27-33 (Dec. 6, 2007) (amending Rule 14a-8
to allow management to exclude shareholder proposals that would require management to
include a shareholder nominee in the company's proxy statement).
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the governance process in a manner designed to reduce rather than
promote shareholder governance rights.
B. Rule #2: Observe No Charades
The Commission sometimes relies on legal obligations imposed by
other regulators, integrating them into the requirements of the securities
laws. This might include the requirements of, or definitions from, the
stock exchanges (particularly those relating to independent directors), or
The Commission,
from state law, such as fiduciary obligations. 4'
however, must acknowledge the weaknesses in these respective regimes.
It does no good to rely on them if they do not work properly.
The NYSE definition of independent director suffers from a number of
deficiencies.
Most importantly, in determining independence, the
242
It likewise
definition excludes in practice the fees paid to directors.
excludes directors affiliated with non-profit organizations where the
company or its employees make significant contributions, does not
screen for relationships between directors and executive officers, and
does not pick up other non-family personal relationships on the board.243
The rule also allows directors to make $100,000 in addition to fees
without losing their independence, something not permitted under
SOX.2 4

The weaknesses in the definition have not been entirely lost on

the Commission.

245

Similarly, state law fiduciary duties have become

241. See, e.g., Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release
No. 7107, Exchange Act Release No. 34,831, Investment Company Act Release No.
20,619, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 52,730 (Oct. 19, 1994) (discussing proposal by commissioner to
add a "safe harbor provision patterned after the state-law 'business judgment rule."'); see
also supra note 2.
242. The consideration of fees is excluded from the categorical restriction that
disqualifies anyone who has been paid directly more than $100,000 within any twelvemonth period during the prior three years. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §
303A.02(b)(ii) (2003). The definition also disqualifies anyone with a material financial
relationship with the company. Id. § 303A.02(a). That provision does not expressly
exclude consideration of fees. Nonetheless, companies do not disqualify as nonindependent directors who receive payments as high as $1 million. Id. § 303A.02(b)(v).
The problem may be the definition, but just as likely it is a failure of management to
properly apply the definition and the failure of the NYSE to enforce its listing standards
by sanctioning companies who misapply the definition.
243. Thus, when it was disclosed that an "independent" director on the compensation
committee of UnitedHealth had an outside business relationship with the CEO, the
director still apparently qualified as independent under NYSE's definition. See Steven
Pearlstein, UnitedHealth's Options Scandal Shows FamiliarSymptoms, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 2006, at D1.
244. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b)(ii).
245. See Fog Cutter, Exchange Act Release No. 52,993, 2005 SEC LEXIS 3280, at *8
n.6 (Dec. 21, 2005), aff'd, 474 F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that while five of seven
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progressively weaker. The Commission should not ignore the low
standards applicable under the duty of care and the use of process to
fulfill the duty of loyalty.
When relying on the NYSE definition of independent director or the
mandates of state fiduciary obligations, the Commission needs to take
these weaknesses into account. This could include a regulatory fix.246 In
the case of the definition of independent director, the Commission could
do a number of things, including adopting a different, more effective
definition. But even in addition to this, it could add other categorical
restrictions beyond those contained in the NYSE definition. The
Commission could, for example, require that the independent directors
meet the stricter definition contained in SOX, and require that in
determining a material financial relationship the board consider the
payment of fees.247

C. Rule #3: CorporateGovernance and Ensuringthe Integrity of the
Disclosure Process
Accurate disclosure cannot be ensured by mandating rules and waiting
for compliance. Inaccurate disclosure may occur because of fraud but it
is far more likely to occur because of misapplication of existing rules and
processes.
Human error, sloppiness, and lack of attention all play a
• 248
role.
There needs to be a system in place designed to ensure the
quality of the external disclosure. Much of the criticism of Enron
centered on disclosure. In some ways, Enron's disclosures were accurate,
but they conveyed a misleading impression about the financial health of
the company. 249

directors on the company's board were "independent" under rules of NASD, all of the
directors had "family, business, or social ties" to the CEO).
246. See Microstrategy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43,724, 73 SEC Docket 2860,
2866 (Dec. 14, 2000) ("The new independent member of the Board of Directors,
appointed pursuant to these undertakings, shall review the Company's implementation of
and compliance with these undertakings.").
247. The Commission has already employed the SOX definition in at least one
instance. See supra note 205.
248. See David Reilly, Restatement Blame: Basic Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006,

at C4 ("Research by the SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant found about 55% of recent
restatements were due to companies misapplying basic accounting rules or to problems
with records that meant they didn't have the correct data to get the accounting right ....
[M]any restatements were 'just from flat-out errors."' (quoting SEC Deputy Chief
Accountant Scott Taub)).
249.

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient CapitalMarkets: CorporateDisclosure and

Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 397 (2004) ("The special purpose entities hid Enron's
true financial condition so that the company's books indicated that Enron was in far better
shape than it truly was, and one would have had to do an almost impossible inspection to
know the true financial condition of the company." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Commission spent much of the 1980s and 1990s trying to get
qualitatively better MD&A disclosure. The agency devoted considerable
resources to the project, issuing a number of lengthy interpretive releases
and bringing a significant number of enforcement actions 50 Throughout
the period, the agency repeatedly instructed companies that the
disclosure should be "through the eyes of management., 25 ' The
approach did not work, and ultimately the Commission gave up.
The quality of disclosure and the vibrancy of the internal controls
depends upon the process used within the company for putting the
disclosure together. Defining the responsibilities of particular persons or
offices and defining the necessary set of procedures is a matter of
substance. With SOX already increasing the accountability of the CEO
and CFO, this primarily means developing the role of the board of
directors in the disclosure process.252
In some ways, the nexus with the disclosure process provides limits on
the involvement of the Commission in the governance process.
Regulatory efforts need not attempt to entirely supplant state fiduciary
obligations. Thus, there is no need to define the circumstances in which a
board will be acting in the best interests of the shareholders or the
instances that trigger application of the duty of loyalty. Intervention
would be limited to those efforts designed to protect the integrity of the
disclosure process.
D. Rule #4: Absent Commission Action, Congress Will Intervene

Whatever the history in this area, SOX changed the landscape. For the
second time, Congress has inserted the Commission directly into the

250. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831,
Investment Company Act Release No. 16,951, 43 SEC Docket 1577, 1578 (May 18, 1989);
Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, [1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,118, at 88,622-44 (Apr. 20, 1987). The
Commission followed with a number of enforcement proceedings, including the first ever
alleging a violation of the MD&A requirements in a case that did not allege fraud or some
other significant violations. See Caterpillar, Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 51 SEC
Docket 147, 153 (Mar. 31, 1992). These efforts are discussed in J.ROBERT BROWN, JR.,
THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE (3d ed. 1999).
251. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, supra note 243, at 1578; Concept Release on Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, supra note 243, at 88,623; Caterpillar,
supra note 243, at 151.
252. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
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213

governance process.
The old adage that the Commission is limited to
disclosure, while never entirely accurate, is now entirely inaccurate. The
newly granted authority to some degree overrules the court's decision in
M
Business Roundtable.2
VI. CONCLUSION
In the post-SOX landscape, the Commission can no longer stay above
the governance fray, comfortable that its only role is the regulation of
disclosure. In the specific area of audit committees there will be a need
to monitor performance and potentially impose additional substantive
obligations and duties on the committee. It may be necessary to further
tighten the definition of independent director.
At the same time, the Commission has real authority to ensure
accountability for disclosure within the company, particularly with
respect to the board of directors. Over time, the Commission will likely
need to impose specific requirements and specific roles on the board,
particularly in the context of setting up and reviewing the internal
controls. Directors will come to learn that inattention in this area will
create the specter of liability under the securities laws and will respond
accordingly. As state law continues its downward spiral and the
exchanges embrace the "for profit" motivation, the exercise of this
authority becomes even more critical.

253. The adoption of section 14(a) in 1934 was the first. See generally Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 881, 895 (codified as amended
15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000)).
254. See Wu, supra note 191, at 251 ("Because Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance
provisions are aimed primarily at ensuring audit committee independence, any corporate
governance standard the SEC promulgates under section 19(c) must serve that same goal
to survive judicial scrutiny.").

